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5the effects of intermarriage on the 
earnings of Female immigrants 
in the united states
Milena Nikolova
ABstrACt
 This paper investigates the effects of intermarriage on the earnings of 
female immigrants in the United States. The main empirical question asked is 
whether immigrant females married to US-born spouses have higher earnings 
than those of immigrant females married to other immigrants. Using 1970 and 
1870 samples of IPUMS data, I estimate an earnings equation through OLS. I 
also correct for the labor force selection bias using the Heckman procedure. 
I finally take into account the endogeneity of intermarriage and apply a two-
stage least squares (2SLS) estimation procedure. I find that there is a positive 
marriage premium among immigrant females in the United States but a 
negative intermarriage premium for exogamously married females compared 
to endogamously married females. My results show that the longer the 
immigrant stays in the host country, the higher her wages, which is evidence 
for the assimilation effect over time. I find some evidence for a negative labor 
force selection bias among immigrant females. In other words, higher human 
capital women may select themselves out of the labor force, while lower human 
capital women are working for wages. Among those who are in the labor force, 
however, married females earn more than singles. I also conclude that being 
an immigrant from an English-speaking country does not have any impact on 
wages. Both premiums become statistically insignificant in difference from 
zero when 2SLS is used as an estimation procedure. 
INtrODUCtIONI. 
This paper investigates the effects of intermarriage on the earnings of female 
immigrants in the United States. The main empirical question asked is whether 
there exists an intermarriage premium, i.e. whether immigrant females married 
to US-born spouses have higher earnings than immigrant females married 
to other immigrants. Studying the determinants of immigrants’ earnings is 
important for several reasons. From an applied economics perspective, this 
6study adds to the deeper understanding of labor market processes such as 
the transferability of human capital across countries. This research expands 
the existing literature by estimating both the marriage and intermarriage 
premiums for female foreigners. More precisely, I look at the wage differentials 
between intermarried and non-intermarried females. From the vantage point 
of sociology, intermarriage is important as it constitutes the highest degree 
of assimilation of immigrants (Wildsmith, Gutmann, and Gratton, 2003). 
From a public policy view, it is necessary to understand the implications of 
intermarriage on the economic assimilation of immigrants in order to make 
adequate public policy decisions. Lack of assimilation of immigrants may result 
in social and political turmoil. Understanding of the processes of immigration 
and assimilation is a necessary public policy prerequisite, especially given the 
relatively big flows of immigrants in the United States. 
In this paper, by intermarriage or exogamous marriage, I mean the de 
facto marital union between a female immigrant and a US-born male. Any 
immigrant married to a non-native will be considered non-intermarried or 
endogamously married. 1
This research question has its theoretical foundations in the marriage and 
assimilation literatures, and it belongs to the new branch of intermarriage 
literature. The marriage literature finds that married men have higher incomes 
than single men. Married men benefit from marriage as their spouses may 
choose to specialize in household production to support the human capital 
accumulation of their husbands, which would later lead to husbands’ higher 
earnings (Becker 1973). At the same time, however, Becker (1985) argues 
that because raising children and housework require more effort than other 
household activities, married women are less productive in the labor market 
than married men for similar human capital endowments. Empirical results 
show that while the marriage premium is well established for males, there 
might be a zero or a negative premium for women. Neumark and Koremann 
(1992) find a positive female marriage premium but provide no compelling 
explanation for it. 
Duleep and Sanders (1993) suggest that the gap between actual and potential 
earnings for the endogamously married females might not close over time, as 
they may take dead-end jobs to support their husbands’ investment in human 
capital. In other words, upon arrival, immigrant wives may work more than their 
husbands to support them (Baker and Benjamin, 1997). Using Canadian data, 
1  The terms “exogamous” and “endogamous” marriage are borrowed from Meng and Gregory’s paper (2005). 
7Baker and Benjamin (1997) find empirical evidence for the family investment 
hypothesis for endogamously married females. Given the family investment 
hypothesis, decisions regarding the labor force for intermarried immigrants 
may differ from those of non-intermarried immigrant females. In particular, 
intermarried females might feel protected by their husband’s social networks 
and financial support and might not feel the pressing need to perform to the 
best of their ability or take jobs with long hours, etc. 
According to the assimilation literature, upon arrival, immigrants have 
lower earnings than natives because of the relative intransferability of skills 
across countries, insufficient host-country language skills, lack of information 
about the host country’s culture and labor markets, as well as other factors. 
Chiswick (1978) proposes that this “initial earning deficiency” disappears as 
immigrants spend more time in the host country and gain country-specific 
knowledge and experience.2 
The intermarriage literature is a new branch that unites the marriage 
and assimilation literatures. Using Australian census data for four years, 
Meng and Gregory (2005) were the first researchers to study intermarriage 
as a mechanism for economic assimilation. When they take into account the 
endogeneity of marriage, the intermarriage premium is 5% for men and 10% 
for women. Meng and Gregory’s results cannot be extrapolated to the U.S. 
case since the immigrant pools are different in the two countries. While they 
account for the endogeneity of intermarriage, Meng and Gregory fail to correct 
for the labor force participation selection problem, which may be particularly 
severe in the female sample.3 
Using French data, Meng and Meurs (2006) study the effects of intermarriage 
on the economic assimilation process for female and male immigrants. They 
propose that the intermarriage effects of economic assimilation should consist of 
an improvement in the language skills and the acquisition of information about 
the local labor markets. When individual characteristics and the endogeneity 
of intermarriage are taken into account, the premium rises to between 25% 
and 35%. The authors find that the magnitude of the intermarriage premium is 
higher for individuals with better language skills.
2  In addition, as time spent in the United States increases, immigrants are more likely to move to jobs where   
 their productivity is higher, which is another explanation for the closing of the earnings gap (Chiswick, 1978).  
3  With the labor force selection problem, we are concerned that the sample of working individuals is a non- 
 random sample of the population since for those who are working, the reservation wage is below the market  
 wage. In this sense, the selection bias is equally valid for male and for female samples. In addition, the selection 
 bias could be present in the male sample as well since, just like females, males could be facing the same   
 constraints and responsibilities within the household (i.e. time to take care of children, housework, etc). Given  
 the traditional gender roles of females, however, it is generally agreed that the workforce selection bias is   
 greater in female samples than in male samples (Korenmann and Neumark, 1992). 
8To date, Kantarevic (2004) is the only scholar to investigate the link between 
intermarriage and the economic assimilation of immigrants using United States 
IPUMS data for 1970 and 1980. He finds evidence for his selection hypothesis, 
which is based on the assumption that the relationship between intermarriage 
and assimilation is spurious, as the intermarried immigrants could well be a 
self-selected sample of all married immigrants. In other words, he considers 
a selection bias related to intermarriage rather than an endogeneity problem. 
Even if the place of birth does not affect productivity, the birthplace of the 
spouse may be related with work productivity. He further argues that this 
could be due to omitting a characteristic such as personal charisma or physical 
appearance.  Kantarevic also examines the productivity hypothesis that native 
spouses facilitate human capital accumulation of their immigrant partners, 
implying that the earnings of intermarried immigrants must be statistically 
significantly different than those of identical non-intermarried immigrants.4 
Kantarevic finds a 2.5% premium for male intermarried immigrants, but the 
premium disappears once he corrects for the selection bias.
Given the literature, the question that this paper asks remains unanswered. 
Using IPUMS data for 1970 and 1980, and correcting for the labor force 
selection bias and the endogeneity of marriage, this project contributes 
to the intermarriage literature in at least two ways through (i) studying the 
female sample to provide a fuller view of the United States labor and marriage 
markets; (ii) studying both the intermarriage and marriage premiums among 
immigrants. In Section II, I present the model. In Section III, I discuss the 
data and methodology, followed by the empirical results in Section IV. Finally, 
Section V offers the concluding remarks. 
EMPIrICAL MODELII. 
The formal theoretical model is developed by Kantarevic (2004), based 
on a standard immigrant earnings equation proposed by Borjas (1999). An 
immigrant has the following choices of marriage: to marry endogamously (i.e. 
marry another member of her own group or another foreign-born individual), 
to marry exogamously (i.e. marry a native-born individual), or to remain single. 
The individual’s objective is to maximize her lifetime utility, which is a function 
of monetary and non-monetary gains associated with each type of marriage. 
The expected earnings and the marital state depend on the human capital and 
assimilation variables for each individual. The costs for each type of marriage 
depend on the individual characteristics and alternative determinants of costs. 
4  Human capital accumulation stemming from intermarriage can be only imperfectly observed or not observed at all.
9Based on Kantarevic’s theoretical model, following empirical model can be 
developed:
Yit = α0 + α1 Marriedit + α2 Exogamousit + α3 Hit + α4 Ait + εit        
(1)
where the dependent variable Yit is the log hourly wage, Married is a dummy 
variable having a value of one for married females and 0 for singles, Exogamous 
is a dummy variable having a value of one for exogamously married females 
and 0 for singles and endogamously married females, H is a vector of human 
capital and demographic variables (age, years of schooling, race, place of 
birth, place of residence, etc), and A captures the assimilation variable years 
since migration.5 A detailed description of the dependent variables and the 
independent variables is available in Table 1 in the Appendix.
The regression equation for the Heckman labor force selection 
correction model is similar to the wage equation (1). It is observed only when 
the labor market wage is greater than the reservation wage for each female 
immigrant, i.e when the income earned is positive. The Selection mechanism 
is given by the following equations: 6
Selection Mechanism:
Zi* = γ’Wi + μi
Zi = 1 if Zi* > 0,
Zi = 0 if Zi* ≤ 0
Prob (Zi = 1) = Φ (γ’Wi),
Prob (Zi = 0) = 1- Φ (γ’Wi).
Regression Model:
Yi = α+ βiXi + εi observed if Zi = 1
(μ, εi ) ~ N[0,0,1,σε , ρ]
where Zi* is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the female earns income, and equal 
to 0 otherwise. Wi is a vector of human capital, demographic, and assimilation 
variables, as well as indicator variables for marital status.7 The instrumental 
variables used in the selection equation are the number of own children under 
5 years of age, and the number of own children aged 5-18. 
If the decision to intermarry is independent of the potential earnings, 
we do not have an endogeneity problem and estimating Equation (1) with 
OLS would provide consistent and efficient estimates of the true population 
5 The squared term of the variable years since migration was dropped from the model because it was highly col  
	 linear	with	the	age	and	years	since	migration	variable.	An	English	language	proficiency	variable	would	have		
 been a good additional assimilation variable. It is not included because of its unavailability for both sample years.  
6 Greene (2007). 
7 The maximum likelihood function for this model is given by Maddala (1983).
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parameters. The decision to intermarry, however, may not be independent of 
the potential earnings, which makes the intermarriage variable endogenous. 
There may also be a simultaneity issue as intermarriage could be a factor 
causing and a result of economic assimilation. Since the nature of the marriage 
decision is endogenous, equation (1) is estimated through a two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) regression using the sex ratio and the probability of interethnic 
marriage as the two instrumental variables. 
DAtA AND MEtHODsIII. 
The ideal data for this paper would be panel data where the same individuals 
are traced over time. Due to the unavailability of such data, this paper, like the 
study by Kantarevic (2004), uses two cross-sectional samples (i.e. pooled data) 
- 1970 Form 1 State Sample and 1980 1% Metro Sample U.S. Census samples 
of Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS-98).8 These samples have information 
on age at first marriage and the year of immigration, which are used in the 
construction of a variable indicating whether an immigrant individual arrived 
as single.9 Using at least two years of data allows to control for cohort and 
ageing effects (Kantarevic, 2004). 10
The dependent variable in this study is the logarithm of hourly wage for 
females (in 2000 real dollars), constructed by dividing yearly wages by the 
product of average weeks of work and the average hours of work.11,12 The 
independent variables fall in two categories: human capital/demographic and 
assimilation variables (Table 1). The human capital/demographic variables are: 
age,
       
, education, three indicator variables for place of residence (West, 
Midwest, South, where Northeast is the comparison group), six indicator 
variables for place of birth (North America, South America, Central America 
and the Caribbean, Asia, Africa, Other, where Europe is the comparison group), 
three indicator variables for race (Black, Asian, and Other Race, where White 
is the comparison group).13
8 The IPUMS-USA consists of thirty-eight samples drawn from every available census from 1850 to 2000. It 
 is not panel data, i.e. it does not trace the same individuals over time. Both samples are 1-in-100 national   
 random samples of the population. Sample availability, documentation and other information are available at 
 www.ipums.org/usa/. 
9	 Later	samples	do	not	have	the	information	about	age	at	first	marriage
10 An ageing effect occurs among all cohorts when a variable changes independently as cohorts grow older 
 (Blanchard, Bunker, and Wachs, 2002). Cohort effects are independent of ageing effects and capture changes   
 affecting populations born at a particular point in time (Blanchard, Bunker, and Wachs, 2002). As Kantarevic 
	 (2004)	points	out,	the	identification	of	each	effect	could	be	done	with	panel	data	or	with	at	least	several	randomly	
 selected cross-sections, which allows for cohorts to be tracked across years. 
11 As the information about weeks and hours worked in 1970 are only available in intervals, these variables were 
 recoded as having values equal to the average of each interval. For consistency, although direct, self-reported 
 information is available for 1980, the interval variables were used in the same way as for 1970. 
12  The appropriate CPI (All Urban Consumers) was used in the creation of the real values of all dollar variables.
13 The most populous category for each variable was used as an omitted (reference) category. 
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Age is used as a proxy variable for experience; given basic labor theory, 
I expect a positive coefficient estimate on age. In addition, the variable ////// 
accounts for the possible concavity of earnings as a function of age.14 I expect 
a negative coefficient estimate on the squared term of age. Since education 
increases marginal productivity and therefore wages, I expect a positive 
coefficient estimate on years of schooling.  The assimilation variable, years 
since migration, is a count variable and I expect a positive coefficient estimate 
on it. 15
The female sample is limited to foreign-born female singles and spouses, 
aged 16 to 65.  Using the variables for the length of marriage and year of 
immigration, the sample is restricted to females who came to the United States 
as unmarried.16,17 The female sample consists only of females whose native 
language is not English. The rationale is that English-speaking immigrants 
could assimilate at a faster rate than non-English speaking immigrants, thus 
pulling up the average earnings of female immigrants.18 The male sample is 
limited to individuals aged 14 to 70 to allow an age difference between actual 
and potential spouses at both ends of the age distribution. 
Next, the dummies endogamous, exogamous, and single are created. 
The exogamous indicator variable has a value of one for all foreign-born 
females who are married to the US-born male heads of households and whose 
husband’s birthplace is the United States. It has a zero value for singles and 
for endogamously married females. The endogamous indicator variable has a 
value of one for all foreign-born females aged 16-65, married to foreign-born 
male heads of households.19, 20
To correct for selection bias related to the labor force participation, two 
instrumental variables are used in the Heckman procedure: number of own 
children under age of five and number of own children aged 5 to 18. I expect 
that having own children lowers the probability of being in the labor force. The 
14 The division by 1000 is done to avoid scaling effects.
15 The square term of the variable was considered as an additional covariate to capture any concavity of the 
 earnings function over time but was not included in the main regressions due to collinearity issues.
16 In this paper, the category “separated” is treated as “married.”
17 Technically, even females who were married upon arrival have the chance to intermarry through divorcing 
 their spouses. Those who face the actual decision of intermarriage, however, are the non-married individuals 
 (i.e. divorced, widowed, and never married individuals) (Gregory and Meng, 2005). 
18 This restriction was later relaxed and for comparison purposes, results from the full sample are provided in 
 Table 9 in the appendix. It is important to point out that the full sample regression results are not substantially 
 different from the main regression results. 
19 The married sample of females in this paper is therefore limited to immigrant spouses married to heads. This 
 is a relatively good way to look at the data since 95% of the married men were heads of household and 5.5% of 
 the married women were heads of household. In other words, 94.5% of the married women were spouses. 
20	 	A	different	specification	check	could	be	including	a	dummy	variable	for	endogamously	married	females	whose	
 spouses are non-US-born native English speakers. Table 10 provides the results from this model. 
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probability of interethnic marriage and the sex ratio are used as instruments 
in the 2SLS model to correct for the endogeneity of intermarriage. First, the 
probability of interethnic intermarriage for females, is: 
Zisg = (msg/Mg)/(ns/N)
where msg is the number of single (never married, divorced, and widowed) men 
in state s of country of origin g (Kantarevic, 2004). Mg is the total number of 
unmarried men in country of origin g in all states; ns is the number of unmarried 
US-born males in a state s, and N is the total number of unmarried men in 
all states. 21 The smaller the value of the probability of marrying within is, the 
higher the likelihood of marrying a native spouse is. 
The likelihood of intermarriage also depends on the sex ratio is defined 
as: SEXRATIOf = Mmsg/ Mfsg
where Mmsg and Mfsg are the numbers of males and females, respectively, in the 
specific  nativity-state group. The higher the sex ratio, the more likely it is for 
the female to marry within her own native group.22 
All four instrumental variables (number of children under age of 5, number 
of children aged 5 to 18, sex ratio, probability of marrying within) theoretically 
satisfy the exclusion restriction. The number of children in the respective ages 
affects the decision to enter the labor force but does not directly affect wages. 
Similarly, the probability of interethnic marriage and the sex ratio affect the 
marriage decision but not wages.23 
This paper uses three different estimation techniques: ordinary least 
squares regression with robust standard errors (OLS), Heckman labor force 
selection correction, and two-stage least squares (2SLS).24,25 I expect the OLS 
estimates to be biased and inconsistent due to the selection and endogeneity 
problems.26 
21 The terms single (never married, divorced, and widowed) and unmarried are used interchangeably in this paper. 
22 The instrument for the probability of marrying within could be thought of as measuring the relative availability 
 of foreign-born potential spouses over native potential spouses, while the sex ratio captures the relative avail
 ability of foreign men to foreign women, i.e. the intra-nativity group competition for spouses.
23 The appropriate census weights were used in the creation of the sex ratio and the probability of marrying within. 
24 The reference group in all models is singles.
25	 Equation	(1)	is	first	estimated	through	OLS	with	robust	standard	errors	to	correct	possible	heteroskedasticity,	
 which is common in cross-sectional data. I also added the sample weights to make the regression representative 
 of the population data.  
26 To address the selection problem regarding the labor force participation, the Heckman correction procedure is 
 followed with the number of own children in the respective age groups as instruments. To address the problem 
 that the choice of intermarriage is endogenous, the two-stage least squares procedure is performed using the sex 
 ratio and the probability of marrying within as instruments. 
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summary statistics1. 
   The final sample consists of 28,970 female immigrants, 11,313 in 1970, 
and 17,657 in 1980. The intermarried females were 6,386 or around 50% of all 
married females during both sample years. In 1970, the number of exogamously 
married female foreigners was 3,299, or 55% of all married foreigners, and in 
1980, the total was 3,087 or 45% of all married female foreigners. Table 2a shows 
the places of origin for the most populous groups of female immigrants as well as 
the percentage of exogamously and endogamously married, and single females. 
Among the countries of origin with the highest share of exogamously married 
females are Sweden (36% of all immigrants in the sample were exogamously 
married), Germany (34% of all immigrants were intermarried), and Italy (29% 
of all immigrants in the sample were exogamously married). The countries with 
the lowest share of exogamously married females are India (12%), China (14%), 
and Turkey (15%). The countries with the highest percentage of endogamously 
married females are Yugoslavia (33%), Italy (31%), China (31%), and the USSR 
(31%). Table 2b shows the intermarriage rates among individuals from the same 
place of origin, measured by the proportion of exogamously married people of 
all married individuals from the same country of origin. The countries with 
the highest percentage of intermarried immigrants are Japan (73%), Germany 
(71%), and the African countries (66%). 
Table 2a: Major Places of Origin and Marriage Rates 
Total Exog Std.dev Endog Std. Dev Single Std. dev
Mexico 4,641 0.20 0.40 0.28 0.45 0.52 0.50
Central America 960 0.17 0.38 0.21 0.41 0.61 0.49
Cuba 1,872 0.08 0.28 0.22 0.42 0.69 0.46
South America 1,381 0.16 0.37 0.17 0.38 0.66 0.47
Sweden 216 0.36 0.48 0.19 0.39 0.45 0.50
Italy 2,412 0.29 0.45 0.31 0.46 0.41 0.49
Germany 3,443 0.34 0.48 0.14 0.35 0.51 0.50
Yugoslavia 369 0.20 0.40 0.33 0.47 0.48 0.50
USSR 847 0.22 0.42 0.31 0.46 0.47 0.50
China 773 0.14 0.34 0.31 0.46 0.55 0.50
Japan 498 0.24 0.43 0.09 0.29 0.67 0.47
India 170 0.12 0.33 0.26 0.44 0.62 0.49
Turkey 101 0.15 0.36 0.22 0.41 0.63 0.48
Africa 266 0.26 0.44 0.14 0.34 0.60 0.49
Number of Observations 6,386 6,549 16,035
(2) The data are listed only for selected major places of origin
(1) The data on percentage intermarried reports the fraction of all individiuals of a particular place of origin who are married to a US-born 
husband. Similar calculations were performed for the endogamous and single groups for both sample years
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Table 3 shows the sample summary statistics for the intermarried and non-
intermarried female immigrants. First, the age structure seems to be similar for 
all three groups, where all groups have a younger average age in the 1980 sample 
than in the 1970 sample. The exogamous group has spent more years in the US 
on average than the endogamous group and the difference between the groups 
is larger in 1980 than in 1970. The single group has spent the shortest amount 
of time in the US among the three groups. On average, the exogamous group 
has more years of education than both the single and the endogamous group 
for both time periods and the single group has more years of schooling than the 
endogamous group for both census years. The level of educational attainment 
was higher in 1980 than in 1970 for all groups. The summary statistics on 
husband’s years of schooling and real annual wages (in 2000 constant dollars), 
and total family annual income (in 2000 constant dollars) are important for 
putting the analysis in a family context. 27
27 Exogamously married females and their husbands on average have more years of schooling than endogamously 
 married females and their husbands. This is one example of assortative marriage, i.e. higher human capital men 
 marrying higher human capital women. This statistic could have potential effects on the work outcomes for 
 women. In particular, relying on the higher incomes and social networks of their husbands, exogamously married 
 females could choose to work less or choose not to take jobs that require a lot of effort. 
Table 2b: Intermarriage rates among major groups
Number Intermar Mean Std. Dev
Mexico 2,210 0.41 0.49
Central America 372 0.45 0.50
Cuba 575 0.27 0.45
South America 468 0.49 0.50
Sweden 118 0.66 0.48
Italy 1,434 0.48 0.50
Germany 1,678 0.71 0.46
Yugoslavia 193 0.38 0.49
USSR 452 0.42 0.49
China 348 0.30 0.46
Japan 165 0.73 0.45
India 65 0.32 0.47
Turkey 37 0.41 0.50
Africa 106 0.66 0.48
(2) The data are listed only for selected major places of origin
(1) The data on percentage intermarried reports the fraction of all married 
individiuals of a particular place of origin who are married to a US-born 
husband for both census years
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On average, the husbands of the exogamously married females have more 
years of schooling than their spouses in both years, and the exogamously married 
females have more years of schooling than the husbands of the endogamously 
married females in 1970. The group with the lowest average level of education 
is the endogamously married females in 1970 and their husbands in 1980. The 
husbands of the exogamous group had higher average real annual wages than 
the husbands of the endogamous group for both years. The average real annual 
wages for both groups of husbands were lower in 1980 than in 1970. Similarly, 
the average total real family annual income for the exogamously married 
females was higher than that of their endogamously married counterparts for 
both years. The singles had the highest total average income in 1970 and the 
lowest average income in 1980. 
Table 4 shows the average real hourly wage (in 2000 constant dollars) for 
the exogamous and endogamous groups. 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev
Age 42.27 13.91 44.90 14.90 41.81 17.79
Years In US 30.33 16.38 29.02 17.79 23.43 17.02
Years of Schooling 13.91 3.44 12.21 4.21 12.73 4.18
Husband's years of schooling 14.36 0.71 12.93 1.70
Husband's real annual wage income 36,382 3,888 31,364 8,584
Total real family annual income 46,847 6,404 42,841 6,510 49,437 6,542
Number of observations 3,299 2,701 5,313
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev
Age 34.26 9.61 33.75 9.89 35.76 15.37
Years In US 19.61 7.61 15.34 8.03 14.74 8.23
Years of Schooling 15.21 3.52 13.88 4.21 14.05 4.09
Husband's years of schooling 15.21 0.78 13.60 2.23
Husband's real annual wage income 32,637 3,089 27,254 6,143
Total real family annual income 49,461 6,432 42,554 7,393 42,113 7,179
Number of observations 3,087 3,848 10,721
Exogamous Endogamous Single
Table 3: Sample Summary Statistics: Intermarried and Non-Intermarried Females
1970
Exogamous Endogamous Single
1980
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In 1970, the average hourly wage was $15.91 for intermarried females, 
$14.76 for non-intermarried females, and $13.79 for singles. In 1980, the 
average hourly wage was lower for all groups, with the highest wage of $12.52 
for the endogamous group, which is similar to Kantarevic’s findings for the 
male sample. This could be reflective of the recessions during the 1970s or 
could be a result of the quality of the immigrant pool in 1980. Table 4 also 
shows the hours per week and weeks worked. In both years, singles had the 
longest hours of work and weeks worked. In 1970, the endogamous group had 
more average weeks worked and hours per week worked than the exogamous 
group. In 1980, the exogamous group worked on average more weeks than 
the endogamous group but the endogamous group worked on average longer 
hours per week. 
 OLs regression results2. 
 Table 5 presents the results from the earnings equation (1) estimated through 
OLS with robust standard errors, the Heckman procedure, and the 2SLS. Let us 
consider the OLS regression results, which I suspect are likely to be biased and 
inconsistent given the selection bias and the endogeneity problem. 
The coefficient estimate on the marriage dummy is positive and 
statistically significant in difference from zero. In particular, on average, the 
predicted value of the earnings of married female immigrants is approximately 
6.2% higher than those of their single counterparts. This result is contrary to 
Becker’s (1985) theoretical framework. It is important to point out that the 
females in this particular sample are only immigrant females, who could have 
different family experiences and work patterns than the average American-
born woman. The coefficient estimate on the exogamous indicator variable 
from the OLS regression is negative and statistically significant in difference 
from zero. It indicates that the predicted value of the earnings for exogamously 
married females is around 6.1% lower than that for the endogamously married. 
The coefficient estimates on age and its squared term, which are statistically 
significant in difference from zero, show that earnings are an increasing and 
concave function of age.  An additional year is expected to increase the predicted 
value of the real hourly earnings of female immigrants by around 4.2%, holding 
constant the influence of the other included independent variables. 
An additional year of schooling is expected to increase the predicted 
value of real hourly wages by around 4.5%, holding constant the influence of 
the other included independent variables. 
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The coefficient estimates on years of schooling is statistically significant 
in difference from zero. Relative to the wages of immigrants born in Europe, 
the predicted value of the earnings of the immigrants born in North America 
are likely to be 22 % lower, holding constant the influence of the other included 
independent variables. The coefficient estimates on the indicator for North 
American origin is statistically significant in difference from zero.28 Relative 
to earnings of European immigrants, the predicted value of the earnings of 
immigrants born in South America, Asia, and Africa are higher, but the 
coefficient estimates are not statistically significant in difference from zero. 
Relative to the wages of immigrants born in Europe, the predicted earnings 
of the immigrants born in Central America and the Caribbean are lower by 
about 3.2%, holding constant the influence of the other included independent 
variables. Relative to the earnings of immigrants born in Europe, the immigrants 
born in other regions are likely to be approximately 5.6% lower, holding 
constant the influence of the other included independent variables. Relative to 
the earnings of immigrants living in the North East, immigrants living in the 
Midwest, South, and West regions are lower. Relative to the earnings of White 
immigrant females, the earnings of Black immigrants are around 6% higher, 
holding constant the influence of the other included independent variables.
The coefficient estimates on Asian and other race are positive but not 
statistically significant in difference from zero. The coefficient estimate on years 
spent in the United States is positive and statistically significant in difference 
from zero. In particular, each additional year spent in the United States 
increases the predicted value of the real hourly wage by about 0.2%, holding 
constant the influence of the other included independent variables. This result 
suggests that an assimilation process is taking place, i.e. immigrant wages are 
increasing as the number of years they spend in the host country increase. Last, 
the coefficient estimate on the indicator variable for 1980 suggests that the 
predicted value of the real hourly earnings in 1980 were 19.5% lower than those 
in 1970, holding constant the influence of the other included independent 
variables. This result could be an echo effect from the economic recessions in 
1973 and 1979.29 
28 The only North American country is Mexico, since immigrants from Canada are English-speaking and are not 
	 included	in	the	sample.	The	coefficient	estimate	on	being	born	in	North	America	changes	its	sign	when	the	full	
	 sample	results	are	introduced	in	Table	9	but	the	coefficient	estimate	is	not	statistically	significant	in	difference	
 from zero. 
29 In general, the total private seasonally adjusted average real wages in 1980 were 5. 46% lower than the cor
 responding value for 1970 for the US economy. Source: author’s calculations using BLS data. http://data.bls.gov.
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Heckman selection Correction regression results3. 
 Table 5 contains the earnings regression results, while Table 6 in the 
Appendix contains the Probit results. In this section, I discuss only selected 
results pertaining to the probability of being in the labor force and the corrected 
earnings results. First, the Probit results indicate that most coefficient estimates 
have the expected signs and are statistically significant in difference from zero. 
As expected, being married, as well as the presence of own children, have a 
negative impact on the probability of being in the labor force. The coefficient 
estimate on the exogamous dummy indicates that relative to the endogamously 
married and singles, exogamously married immigrants have a lower probability 
of being in the labor force. Older age and having more years of schooling 
increase the probability of working for wages. Relative to immigrants born in 
Europe, immigrants born in all other places but North America and Central 
America and the Caribbean, have lower probability of working for wages. 
The coefficient estimate on the indicator for birthplace in North America and 
Central America-Caribbean are both statistically insignificant in difference 
from zero. Relative to immigrants living in the Northeast, immigrants living in 
all other regions but the Midwest have a lower probability of being in the labor 
force. The coefficient estimates on all three indicator variables for place of 
residence are not statistically significant in difference from zero. All other races 
have higher probability of working for wages relative to Whites, which is the 
comparison group. Interestingly, the longer the immigrants stay in the United 
States, the lower their probability of being in the labor force. As mentioned 
above, these females could be supported by their husband’s income and status 
in society. Last, immigrants observed in 1980 had a higher probability of being 
in the labor force relatively to those observed in 1970. 
The Heckman results indicate that the marriage premium is around 7% 
and statistically significant in difference from zero. The intermarriage penalty 
is around 6.1% and is statistically significant in difference from zero.30 The 
coefficient estimates on all other included variables have not changed much 
from the OLS results. The coefficient estimate on lambda is negative, but 
not statistically significant in difference from zero, indicating that there is a 
weak support for the negative selection bias in the labor force among female 
immigrants. In other words, my results show weak evidence that higher human 
capital immigrants are not working for wages. At the same time, among those 
30	 	Kantarevic’s	Heckman	results	for	the	male	sample	indicate	a	positive	but	insignificant	premium.	Correcting	for	
 an intermarriage selection bias, rather than the endogeneity of intermarriage, Kantarevic calculates the 
	 assimilation	effect,	i.e.	the	difference	between	the	coefficient	estimates	on	age	(age	squared),	years	since	
 migration (years since migration squared) over the two time periods. 
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who are working for wages, there is a positive marriage premium and an 
intermarriage penalty. One explanation for the marriage premium could be the 
fact that the average age for both sample years of these immigrants is between 
42-45 years for 1970, and 34-36 for 1980. More precisely, if these women have 
own children, these children are possibly old enough to provide help with the 
household chores and raising younger siblings. This additional help could 
take away part of the effort for the mothers. As they do not need to put so 
much effort and labor within the household, these women could improve their 
performance at work, allowing them to earn higher wages than their single 
counterparts. It is important to emphasize that foreign females could have 
different work patterns and household experiences than the American-born 
females. In addition, both the OLS results and the Heckman results show a 
wage penalty for immigrants who are married to US-born spouses relative 
to those married to foreign-born spouses. One possible explanation for this 
penalty is that unlike the endogamous group, intermarried females do not face 
the pressure to increase their productivity and performance on the job.31 In 
light of the family investment hypothesis, an additional explanation of this 
result could focus on the endogamous group. Non-intermarried females might 
need to be more productive or take higher paying jobs than their intermarried 
counterparts in order to support their husband’s investments in human 
capital. 
Probability of Intermarriage and 2sLs regression results4. 
 Table 7 in the Appendix shows the multinomial logistic regression results 
for the probability of being intermarried for the exogamous and endogamous 
groups.32 Most coefficient estimates have the expected signs and are statistically 
significant in difference from zero. The probability of intermarriage is an 
increasing and concave function of age since the coefficient estimate on age 
is positive and the coefficient on the squared term of age is negative for both 
groups. Relative to singles, more years of schooling increases the probability 
of marrying exogamously and lowers the probability of being endogamously 
married. Relative to being born in Europe, which is the omitted category, being 
born in any other region but North America lowers the probability of being 
exogamously married relative to being single. Relative to being born in Europe, 
being born in any other region but Central America and the Caribbean lowers 
31 As Table 3 shows, intermarried females enjoy both higher average husband’s income and higher total family 
 incomes than the non-intermarried immigrants.
32 The reference category is singles.
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the probability of being exogamously married relative to being single. Relative 
to living in the Northeast, which is the omitted category, living in any other 
region increases the probability of being exogamously married relative to being 
single and lowers the probability of being endogamously married relative to 
being single. Relative to being White, which is the omitted category, being Black 
and Asian lowers the probability of being intermarried relative to being single, 
while belonging to other races increases the probability of being intermarried 
relative to being single. Relative to being White, being Black and Other race 
lowers the probability of being endogamously married relative to single, while 
being Asian increases the probability of being endogamously married relative 
to being single. Spending more years in the United States increases both the 
probability of being intermarried and being non-intermarried relative to 
being single. Higher values for the sex ratio increases the probability of being 
intermarried and being endogamously married relative to being single. The 
relative availability of marriage partners from own ethnic group decreases the 
probability of being married to a native relative to not being married at all 
and increases the probability of being married to a foreigner relative to being 
single. 
 In the 2SLS procedure, the decisions to marry and intermarry are treated 
as endogenous. The results are shown in Table 5. Most coefficient estimates 
are not statistically significant in difference from zero. I am only going to 
focus on the coefficient estimates on the marriage indicators and the years 
spent in the United States. Although none of these three coefficient estimates 
is statistically significant in difference from zero, I am going to discuss their 
economic significance. First, the marriage premium entirely disappears and 
becomes a marriage penalty of over 100%. Second, the intermarriage penalty 
is still negative and it more than triples in size. Third, the coefficient estimate 
on years spent in the Untied States remains positive, suggesting an assimilation 
effect of spending more time in the host country. 
specification Check: relaxing the Non-English speaking Criterion5. 
The regression results when the restriction that immigrants should come 
from a non-English speaking country (NESC) is relaxed are shown in Table 
8 in the Appendix. They serve as a specification check and do not show any 
fundamental differences with the NESC results. The coefficient estimate on 
the marriage premium is positive and statistically significant in difference from 
zero from the OLS and Heckman results, and is negative and insignificant 
from the 2SLS results, which is similar to the NESC results. The intermarriage 
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income penalty is statistically significant in difference from zero from the OLS 
and Heckman results and is negative and insignificant from the 2SLS results, 
which is similar to the NESC results. The dummy variable for English speaking 
country is negative and not statistically significant in difference from zero from 
all three specifications. The years in the United States variable is still positive 
but not statistically significant in difference from zero. Both assimilation 
variables are not statistically significant in difference from zero, indicating that 
adding the English-speaking immigrants to the sample diminishes the relative 
importance of the assimilation variables for the wage equation. Most of the 
coefficient estimates on the rest of the included independent variables are 
similar to the NESC sample regression results. 
specification Check: English-speaking Immigrant Husbands6. 
 As an additional model specification check, I included a dummy variable 
for the native English-speaking husbands of the endogamously married females. 
The results in Table 9 in the Appendix do not show any major differences from 
the previous specifications. Some results are worth addressing. The marriage 
premium is still positive and significant from the OLS and Heckman results 
and negative and not statistically significant in difference from zero from the 
2SLS. It increases more than four times when the Heckman estimation is used. 
The intermarriage premium is still negative but is not statistically significant 
in difference from zero from the 2SLS results. The coefficient estimate on the 
assimilation variable years in the US is statistically significant in difference from 
zero only from the Heckman results. The coefficient estimate on whether the 
immigrant female came from an English-speaking country is negative and not 
statistically significant in difference from zero from all three specifications. The 
dummy variable on whether the husband of the endogamously married female 
came from an English-speaking country is negative and statistically significant 
in difference from zero from the OLS results and positive and insignificant in 
difference from zero from the Heckman and 2SLS results. This provides only 
poor evidence on the effects of language on the assimilation dynamics and 
earnings of immigrants. 
Further Discussion of results 7. 
 The differences between the Heckman method and the OLS are practically 
small and are most likely due to the fact that the coefficient estimate on lambda 
is not statistically significant in difference from zero. The Heckman results and 
the 2SLS results differ significantly. On the one hand, this is due to the fact that 
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they correct for different sources of bias, i.e. the Heckman procedure corrects 
for selection bias while the 2SLS corrects for endogeneity.33,34 Both estimation 
techniques provide consistent estimates in large samples. The Heckman results 
are not as efficient as maximum likelihood estimates. The 2SLS have increased 
variances and standard errors, which may explain the statistically insignificant 
in difference from zero results. In addition, if the fit of the reduced form equation 
is relatively poor, then 2SLS estimators will be still biased. The difference in the 
results from the Heckman and the 2SLS procedures could also be reflective of a 
poor choice of instruments for the 2SLS estimation. Given the shortcomings, the 
Heckman results may be better estimates of the true population parameters. A 
potentially superior estimation method will be a sample selection model with a 
common dummy endogenous regressor in simultaneous equations. While this 
estimation technique will allow us to tackle both sources of bias simultaneously, 
it may be econometrically challenging. Particularly challenging aspects of this 
estimation technique may involve establishing the sampling distribution of the 
estimators and obtaining consistent and efficient coefficient estimates. 
V.  CONCLUsION
 This paper investigated whether female immigrants married to US-
born spouses (i.e. exogamously married immigrants) have higher earnings 
than female immigrants married to other immigrants (i.e. endogamously 
married immigrants). I find that there is a marriage premium that is positive 
and statistically significant in difference from zero even when I correct for the 
labor force selection bias. One explanation for this premium could be that 
married female immigrants have older children at home who can take care 
of the household and release the burden on the mothers. This could make 
these married foreign females more productive at work. In addition, I find that 
exogamously married immigrants receive an intermarriage penalty. My results 
show that there is a negative selection bias in the labor force among female 
immigrants. In other words, higher human capital immigrants are not working 
for wages. At the same time, among those who are working for wages, there is 
a positive marriage premium and an intermarriage penalty. When I correct for 
33 The 2SLS also corrects for simultaneity, or the fact that intermarriage can be both a cause and a result of 
 economic assimilation of immigrants. 
34 The Heckman procedure deals with the problem that selection bias causes the error term to be correlated with 
 an explanatory variable (Kennedy, 2003). The Heckman estimates the probability of being in the labor force 
	 first	on	the	basis	of	a	probit	model	and	generates	the	Inverse	Mills	Ratio,	which	is	used	as	an	additional	regressor	
	 in	the	earnings	equation	(Gujarati,	22003).	The	Heckman	estimator	is	consistent	but	not	as	fully	efficient	as	the	
 maximum likelihood estimates (Kennedy, 2003; Kantarevic, 2004). 2SLS sweeps clean the dependent variable 
	 of	the	influence	of	the	error	term	by	obtaining	the	estimator	of	Y	from	the	reduced-form	equation	and	then		 	
 replacing it in the original equation to produce consistent estimates (Gujarati, 2003).
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the endogeneity of the marriage decision, I find that that exogamously married 
female immigrants still receive a penalty relative to exogamously married 
immigrants. This premium is economically significant but not statistically 
significant in difference from zero and no meaningful interpretations of it 
can be done. The negative premium could be due to the fact that unlike their 
exogamous counterparts, non-intermarried females do not enjoy the same high 
husband’s income and husband’s social networks. Their motivation to perform 
better on the job, therefore, could be stronger than that of the intermarried. 
 These results contrast the findings of Meng and Gregory (2005) and Meng 
and Deurs (2006) for Australia and France, respectively, who find positive, 
significant, and robust intermarriage premiums among immigrants. Kantarevic 
(2004) finds a male intermarriage premium of about 2.5 %, which disappears 
once the specification controls are introduced. 
 Given that the intermarriage literature is in its infancy, many interesting 
empirical questions arise. In particular, further investigations of the marriage 
premium among immigrant females could be done. Finding an alternative 
estimation technique that will allow to handle both the selection bias and the 
endogeneity simultaneously may be superior but econometrically challenging. 
In addition, if data availability permits, the intermarriage premium could be 
studied across different countries over time. Finding a different data might 
allow for fixed and random effects, as well as adding occupational dummy 
variables to account for some of the variation in the marriage premium. 
The cross-generational effects, i.e. what happens to the premium in for the 
descendants of the endogamously married and endogamously married females 
are still questions that remain unanswered. 
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industry structure similarities, 
trade Agreements, and business cycle 
synchronization
Samuel Marll
Abstract
 This paper analyzes the effects of industry structure similarities, free trade 
agreements, and geographic borders on regional business cycle correlation, 
using fifty US states, 10 Canadian provinces, and 1 Canadian territory as a 
case study. Using two cross-sectional OLS regressions and one panel data OLS 
regression, this study finds that pair-wise gross territorial product growth 
correlation decreased significantly after NAFTA ratification for state-state, 
province-province, and state-province territorial pairs, contrary to previous 
literature’s results. NAFTA effectively decoupled intra-national business cycles 
in the US and Canada while also desynchronizing cross-border pair-wise GSP 
growth correlation, but cross-border pair-wise GSP growth correlation was 
much less desynchronized post-NAFTA relative to intra-national pairs. These 
results indicate that NAFTA and the US-Canada border may produce two 
opposing forces that dampen each other’s desynchronizing effects. 
Introduction
The United States and Canada have a unique economic relationship. 
Sharing the longest unfortified border in the world, similar cultures, and a 
common language, the two nations are each others’ largest trading partners. 
US-Canada goods trade increased dramatically after 1988, when the Canada-
United States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) was ratified, eliminating tariffs 
on most trans-border goods trade. 1994 witnessed the ratification of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), superseding CUSFTA. NAFTA’s 
immediate effects were to reduce or eliminate the majority of remaining tariffs 
on motor vehicles, computers, textiles, agriculture, and other commodities 
between the US, Canada, and Mexico. With tariffs and barriers removed, goods 
trade in these sectors increased appreciably from 1994 to 2004, jumping 110.1% 
over a period of ten years. As of 2007, exports and imports to and from the US 
constitute 81% and 67% of total Canadian exports and imports, respectively, 
while exports and imports from Canada comprise 23% and 17% of total US 
exports and imports. 
31
 This astronomical rise in US-Canada goods trade, spurred by advances 
in North American economic integration, is hotly debated in Canadian policy 
circles. Opponents of the two trade agreements argue that further economic 
integration will tighten alignment of the Canadian business cycle with that 
of the US due to increased trans-border goods flows and bind growth in 
export-driven sectors of the Canadian economy to developments in American 
markets. Blayne Haggart, a research analyst reporting to Canadian Parliament, 
voiced concerns that “Greater economic integration will lead to the dissolution 
of Canada (2001)”. The monetary economist Thomas Courchene also noted 
in his empirical research that “We are witnessing the rise of ‘region-states’, 
where geographic regions trade within their own area (2000)”. This scenario 
culminates in Canada’s economic degeneration into a market integrally linked 
to developments in US goods and asset markets. 
 Answering the question of whether trade agreements and industry 
structure similarity synchronize regional business cycles would determine 
whether North American trade integration is inextricably tying Canadian 
goods markets to those of the US.  This paper analyzes the effects of industry 
structure similarity, the US-Canada border, and NAFTA ratification on 
synchronicity of regional US and Canadian economic growth from 1984 
to 2004. The analysis finds that GDP growth correlation at the state and 
provincial level decreased significantly after NAFTA ratification. Agriculture 
and mining industry structure similarities were found to have strongly positive 
and statistically significant impacts on GSP growth correlation. Convergence 
of industry structure similarity in these two sectors increases predicted GSP 
growth correlation appreciably. Manufacturing industry structure similarity 
was not found to be a statistically significant determinant. 
 Prior to NAFTA ratification, the border weakened predicted cross-border 
pair-wise correlation by 31.4%. However, NAFTA and the border may have 
produced two opposing channels that served to dampen the desynchronizing 
effect. After NAFTA ratification, the border desynchronized cross-border 
pairs by only 13.7%. NAFTA’s deregulatory effects may have spurred increases 
in intra-industry trade volume between states and provinces that were not 
possible between intra-national pairs. 
 Intra-nationally, NAFTA desynchronized state-state and province-province 
pairs by 24.1%. The border dampened NAFTA’s desynchronizing effect to some 
extent, with cross-border pairs’ predicted correlation coefficients reduced by 
only 6.4%. The geographic border and NAFTA ratification negate each other’s 
desynchronizing forces to some extent, leaving post-NAFTA intra-national 
32
business cycles much more strongly desynchronized than post-NAFTA cross-
border business cycles. All regional business cycles were desynchronized, but 
NAFTA impacted intra-national pairs much more strongly than cross-border 
pairs. 
Literature review
 In a theoretical context, the impact of increased goods trade on business 
cycle synchronization is ambiguous. Assuming demand-side shocks drive 
business cycles, inter-industry trade increases between country pairs should 
channel the effects of these shocks from one country to another, leading to 
an increase in business cycle correlation as trade increases. For example, 
positive shocks to an economy could lead to increased income, subsequently 
increasing demand for imports from another economy, accelerating economic 
growth in the second country via export-led growth. The magnitude of the 
shock’s transmission to the second economy would presumably be positively 
correlated with the level of trade between the two. 
 This conclusion rests on the assumption that the increases in trade are 
not intra-industrial, and that economies’ production structures do not become 
more similar as a result. Krugman (1993) argues that as trade integration 
progresses, countries specialize in production of specific outputs. Therefore, 
trade integration that induces asymmetric industry specialization should 
desynchronize business cycles. We can alternatively assume that shocks are 
specific to distinct industries within the economy, which may have offsetting 
effects. 
 If increases in trade are intra-industrial, and economies’ production 
structures become increasingly similar as trade increases, then with business 
cycles dominated by industry-specific shocks, trade integration that increases 
intra-industry trade should lead to increased synchronization of business 
cycles, due to the more symmetric response of economies to shocks. Frankel 
and Rose (1998) assert that the nature of trade integration and international 
trade can cause business cycles to converge or diverge. They argue that “closer 
international trade could result in tighter or looser correlations of national 
business cycles”. Per the Ricardian theory of comparative advantage, closer 
inter-industry trade linkages could result in industry specialization, sensitizing 
economies to industry-specific shocks, thereby leading to more idiosyncratic 
business cycles. If intra-industry trade predominates, then industry-specific 
shocks will create identical responses within economies, synchronizing 
economic growth.
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 Preferential trade agreements’ effect on business cycle correlation is a 
topic that has been explored extensively by European economists, in the wake 
of politicoeconomic integration on that continent. While this research has 
extensively studied the ramifications of trade agreements and currency unions 
for European and Asian markets, there is considerably less research detailing 
trade agreements’ impact on US and Canadian goods markets. This paper fills 
that gap by studying the effect NAFTA has on state-level economic growth 
correlation and intra-industry goods trade.
 Fiess (2007) employs OLS regression and spectral analysis to quantify the 
degree of business cycle correlation between Central American nations and the 
United States in the wake of the Dominican Republic-Central American Free 
Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA). Using band-pass filtered annual data from 
1965 to 2002 for 16 Central American nations, along with monthly data on 
Central American industrial production for 1995 to 2002 (due to a scarcity of 
reliable data for Central American economic activity), he determines the extent 
to which Central American economies are synchronized. Fiess discovers that 
Central American sensitivity to US economic activity has increased over time, 
while the period of relative tranquility in the 1990s increased synchronization 
within Central America. Using a cross-plot of bilateral exports to GDP ratios 
and business cycle coherence, there no evidence of a positive relationship 
between trade intensity and business cycle synchronization. Fiess’s paper 
provides new information regarding the effects of free trade agreements on 
developing countries, specifically those in the Central American region. His 
OLS regression also provides a framework for analyzing the US economy’s 
effect on other nations, and its effect on trade linkages between other country 
pairs. 
 Böwer and Guillemineau (2006) analyze the extent of business cycle 
correlation in the EU. Using extreme-bounds analysis (EBA), they examine 
the transmission mechanism for increased business cycle synchronization 
within the European Monetary Union. Using a vector of coefficients of bilateral 
business cycle correlations for twelve euro area countries, they regress this 
vector on an exogenous variable of interest with a varying set of 1-3 control 
variables, along with gravity theory model variables. From there, they identify 
extreme bounds by generating the lowest and highest values of confidence 
intervals for the estimated parameter on the exogenous variable of interest. If 
the low and high bounds on the interval have the same qualitative sign, and the 
parameter estimate is significant in all regressions, the variable is regarded as 
robust. 
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 They find a positive correlation between bilateral trade and the vector of 
correlation coefficients, as well as for the bilateral trade to GDP ratio. Bilateral 
trade only explains approximately 10% of GDP correlation. Trade openness is 
found to have a positive but statistically insignificant effect on business cycle 
synchronization. Trade specialization also fails to qualify as robust for the 
1980 to 1996 period, but becomes robust for 1997 to 2004. The majority of 
the impact on cycle synchronization appears to come from specialization in 
machinery and transport equipment. They also find a negative relationship 
between economic specialization and cycle correlation, but with a low R2 of the 
regression, the authors conclude that similarity in relative shares of economic 
specialization says little about cycle correlation. Böwer and Guillemineau 
report that external trade is a key determinant of cycle synchronization for the 
euro zone. They find an endogeneity effect for optimal currency areas: If trade 
promotes co-movement of cycles, then a common currency that fosters trade 
leads to increasingly synchronized cycles within the monetary union. Increases 
in intra-industry trade also lead to increased synchronization, judging by its 
status as a robust determinant of cycle correlation in the 1997-2004 period for 
the extreme bounds analysis. 
Chiquiar and Ramos-Francia (2005) analyze the effect of NAFTA on 
commercial integration of industrial and developing countries—in this case, 
the United States and Mexico. They analyze two components of this issue: First, 
whether NAFTA enhanced business cycle synchronization between Mexico and 
US, and second, whether increased competition from other countries (whose 
main advantage is an abundance of unskilled labor) undermined synchronicity 
of US and Mexican business cycles. The authors use spectral analysis, 
cointegration tests, and Granger causality tests to examine this. The spectral 
analysis focuses on manufacturing output behavior for the US and Mexico at 
business-cycle frequencies. Using differenced logs of quarterly manufacturing 
production indices for Mexico and the US from 1980 to 1993, they estimate 
the coherence between these differenced logs. The spectral analyses find 
statistically significant coherence estimates for bands of cycles with periods 
from two to eight years. This corresponds to the average length of business 
cycles. For 1996 to 2004, the coherence tests are run again, and coherences 
are significantly stronger for the post-NAFTA period, implying stronger US-
Mexico business cycle correlation, and more cointegrated manufacturing 
production levels between the two nations. 
 Mexico-US cross correlation patterns in manufacturing output pre- 
and post-NAFTA are also analyzed. Tests indicate that before NAFTA 
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implementation, cyclical movements in US output lead Mexico’s cycle by two 
years. After 1996, that lag period decreased, indicating a shift to a non-lagged 
contemporaneous correlation between manufacturing output cycles. The 
authors find no evidence of cointegration for the pre-NAFTA period, but do 
find evidence for cointegration in the NAFTA period. This suggests Mexican 
cointegration with US manufacturing industries in the wake of NAFTA 
implementation, leading to higher business cycle synchronization. Granger 
causality tests indicate causation is unidirectional from US manufacturing 
production to Mexico’s. Instead of examining US-Mexican output correlation 
directly, Chiquiar and Ramos-Francia examine manufacturing synchronization, 
an industry comprising a significant share of output for both nations. By testing 
the extent of manufacturing industry correlation between nations, they can 
determine how manufacturing shocks affect cycle synchronization for both 
nations. Chiquiar’s paper explains how trade agreements impact a sector of the 
intermediate goods market in North America. The methodology of this paper 
hinges on the assumption that industry-specific shocks (in this case, shocks 
to manufacturing) drive business cycle fluctuations. If cycle fluctuations are 
demand-driven rather than industry-driven, the usefulness of this analysis may 
be limited. 
 Cortinhas (2007) studies the effects of intra-industry trade and industry 
specialization on Southeast Asian business cycle synchronization. He uses 
annual data for real GDP of the five ASEAN nations from 1962 to 1996. 
Cortinhas excludes post-1997 data, to avoid the East Asian financial crisis’s 
distorting effects on the data. Initial OLS and 2SLS empirical results suggest 
a positive correlation between intra-industry trade and cycle synchronization. 
Cortinhas runs a second OLS regression, this time regressing the gap in real 
output growth between country pairs on an index measuring intra-industry 
trade. The parameter on intra-industry trade becomes negative, indicating 
an increase in intra-industry trade will in fact reduce real output growth 
gaps between ASEAN nations. This estimate is consistent with the positive 
parameter on IIT in the first regression. Cortinhas then runs a second 2SLS to 
control for endogeneity, using the same instruments as before, and finds that 
the parameter on intra-industry trade is significant in synchronizing ASEAN 
business cycles at the 1% level. Ultimately, Cortinhas concludes that intra-
industry trade is a significant, robust variable in determining ASEAN cycle 
correlation. He argues that the costs of joining a currency union in ASEAN 
decreases as intra-industry trade increases.  
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 This paper uses OLS regression analysis to measure the effects of NAFTA 
on the correlation of state and provincial level economic growth. Instead 
of examining NAFTA’s effects at a macro level, this analysis uses state and 
provincial data to capture the effects of physical distance, intra-industry trade 
in agriculture, manufacturing, and mining, and the geographic border at a 
microeconomic level. This model can be viewed as a variant of the gravity 
model of trade, since it incorporates control variables for physical distance and 
trade flows. The correlation coefficient of gross state product growth between 
two territories is calculated for all possible pairs of 50 states, 10 provinces, 
and 1 territory, generating 1,830 observations. This correlation coefficient is 
regressed on variables including state/province population levels, distance 
between most populous cities, exports as a share of gross state product, industry 
structure similarity within the mining, agriculture, and manufacturing sectors, 
and a set of dummies and interaction terms representing the geographic border 
and NAFTA ratification. This methodology allows us to measure the effects of 
NAFTA on not only state and provincial level economies, but also on sectors 
of the economy producing highly tradable output, an approach not utilized in 
the aggregate-level analyses of previous literature. 
Methodology
 The regression equation appears below:
ρ I, J = β0 + β1Agriculture sector similarity I, J + β2Manufacturing sector similarity I, J + β3Mining 
sector similarity I, J  + β4ln(Population I) + β5ln(Population J) + β6ln(Distance I, J) + β7Border I, J 
+ β8NAFtA t + β9(Exports/GsPI) + β10(Exports/GsPJ) + ε I, J
 ρ I, J is a correlation coefficient measuring the degree of linear association 
between the GSP growth rate of state/province I and the GSP growth rate of 
state/province J. With this dependent variable, we can measure the synchronicity 
between territory I’s annual economic growth and that of all other territories. 
Data was taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and Statistics Canada. 
Provincial economic data is restricted to 1984 forward, so the scope of the 
analysis is limited to the years 1984 to 2004. 
 The first three regressors are variables measuring the degree of industry 
structure similarity between territory I and all other states and provinces, in 
the agriculture, mining, and manufacturing sectors. Interstate export and 
import data is not collected by US statistical agencies, so direct measures 
of intra-national and intra-industry exports and imports as shares of states’ 
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GSP are infeasible. Using BEA and Statistics Canada data, we instead measure 
industry structure similarities between territory pairs. For two given states 
I and J, agriculture, mining, and manufacturing as a share of each territory’s 
GSP are taken, and averaged over the time period in question, giving us six 
separate values for states I and J containing their respective average shares of 
agriculture, mining, and manufacturing for the time period.
 With these six separate values, the values representing state J’s GSP shares 
are subtracted from the values representing state I’s GSP shares, and then the 
absolute value is taken, giving us 3 variables measuring, as a share of GSP, 
the deviation in industry similarity between state I and state J for agriculture, 
mining, and manufacturing. This set of deviations is computed between state 
I and all 61 territories in the analysis. Trade theory states that as the deviation 
between two territories’ industry as a share of GSP increases, their level of 
intra-industry trade should decrease. With lower levels of intra-industry trade, 
the two territories’ responses to industry-driven economic shocks become 
increasingly asymmetrical. As a result, we expect the signs on these three 
intra-industry trade variables’ coefficients to be negative. 
 Two population variables are also regressors. The first population variable 
corresponds to the log of territory I’s average population over the time period 
of the data set. The second population variable measures the log of territory 
J’s average population over the span of the data set. Previous literature on 
population’s effect on cycle correlation is scarce, but if increases in consumer 
population generate higher demand for tradable output, intra-industry trade 
volume will inflate and synchronize pair-wise territories. Additionally, more 
populous territories should be more economically diversified, stabilizing yearly 
GSP growth. This may affect cycle correlation with other territories. Thus, the 
coefficients on the population vectors should be positive. The regression model 
includes a distance regressor, corresponding to the log of the distance between 
territory I’s most populous city, and the most populous city in territory J. The 
gravity model of trade states that as the distance between territories increases, 
the cost and time necessary to conduct goods trade increases, decreasing the 
predicted amount of total trade. Therefore, we expect the distance regressor’s 
sign to be negative. 
 The border dummy quantifies the effect of the geographic border on 
business cycle correlation. Each entry in this variable corresponds to a pairing 
between territory I and all other territories, registering “0” for intra-national 
pairings, and “1” for pairings that cross the border. International finance 
theory argues that border barriers such as tariffs, customs checkpoints, and 
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trade restrictions reduce trans-border trade volume. With reduced levels of 
intra-industry goods trade, industry-driven shocks will trigger increasingly 
asymmetrical responses to state and province pairs. Thus, the coefficient on 
the border dummy should be negative. 
 Two export variables were included, to estimate the effects of export-
dependent economies on GSP correlation. The first export variable measures 
international exports as a share of the first territory’s gross state product. The 
second measures the same for the second territory’s GSP. As international 
exports as a share of GSP increases, state and province-level economies’ annual 
growth becomes increasingly variant, as fluctuations in the international goods 
market accelerates or depresses export-led growth. If exports as a share of 
gross state product increase, a state-level economy would become increasingly 
tied to developments in other territories’ goods markets. Therefore, we expect 
the coefficient estimates on these variables to be positive. International export 
data for states was not recorded until 1999, so estimates for these variables are 
restricted to the post-NAFTA regression. 
 The NAFTA dummy registers “0” for observations measured in the 
1984-1993 pre-NAFTA dataset, and “1” for observations taken in the 1994-2004 
post-NAFTA dataset. NAFTA’s primary effect was to eliminate all remaining 
tariffs on tradable output in several sectors of the Canadian and US economies. 
With intra-industry trade volume increasing in these newly deregulated sectors, 
and assuming macroeconomic shocks are industry specific, we expect NAFTA 
to increase pair-wise correlation coefficients.
 These vectors are computed for every territory in the analysis, giving us 
60 different sets of observations. These sets are then combined into one large 
set of observations, creating a final group of nine regressors with 1,830 entries 
each. See the following table for summary statistics of the variables.
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Pre-NAFTA (1984-1993)
variable mean std. Dev. min max
Correlation i, J 0.397845 0.354456 -0.71519 0.981224
Agriculture Similarity i, J 0.026751 0.027623 1.85E-06 0.114372
Mining Similarity i, J 0.062572 0.085288 4.67E-06 0.348355
Manufacturing Similarity i, J 0.107517 0.113824 0.000192 0.780746
Ln (Distance i, J) 7.418351 0.775738 2.755334 9.142286
Ln (Population i) 3.571408 0.609343 2.679153 6.994147
Ln (Population J) 4.296975 1.31007 2.679153 6.994147
Post-NAFTA (1994-2004)
variable mean std. Dev. min max
Correlation i, J 0.238658 0.360051 -0.81859 0.995907
Agriculture Similarity i, J 0.021462 0.021531 -0.00554 0.091592
Mining Similarity i, J 0.047482 0.066825 -0.01866 0.238547
Manufacturing Similarity i, J 0.071065 0.052567 -0.06749 0.290645
Ln (Population i) 3.623514 0.605917 2.687775 7.063507
Ln (Population J) 4.339703 1.307634 2.687775 7.063507
(Exports/GSP i) 0.065764 0.046117 0.010517 0.384355
(Exports/GSP J) 0.125679 0.105129 0.010517 0.384355
Pooled (1984-2004)
variable mean std. Dev. min max
Correlation i, J 0.318252 0.365978 -0.81859 0.995907
Agriculture Similarity i, J 0.024106 0.024903 -0.00554 0.114372
Mining Similarity i, J 0.055027 0.076975 -0.01866 0.348355
Manufacturing Similarity i, J 0.089291 0.090497 -0.06749 0.780746
Ln (Population i) 3.597461 0.608108 2.679153 7.063507
Ln (Population J) 4.318339 1.308848 2.679153 7.063507
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table 1. summary statistics for the variables in the OLs analyses.
Conventional standard errors are insufficient for this type of 
regression analysis. Heteroskedasticity in the error term is typical for cross-
sectional regressions dealing with state-level economic data. Additionally, 
autocorrelation in the error term is a likely problem. Typically, serial correlation 
is not a problem for cross-sectional data, as there exists no temporal pattern 
within the residuals. However, spatial autocorrelation may be at work in the 
residuals. If there is an economic component unique to a single state affecting 
its GSP growth, all observations including that territory within the pair will 
suffer from correlation of the residual term. Thus, spatial autocorrelation is 
likely present. To simultaneously correct for heteroskedasticity and spatial 
autocorrelation in the error term, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent standard errors were employed. 
Three separate versions of the regression were run. The first regression 
dropped the entries with a “1” for the NAFTA dummy, giving us coefficient 
estimates for the model prior to NAFTA ratification. The second excluded all 
pre-NAFTA observations, giving the sample regression function for the post-
NAFTA era. Finally, a panel data regression was run, with all entries included, 
allowing us to see the coefficient estimates for the overall time period of 
1984 to 2004. With variation in the NAFTA dummy, the pooled regression 
allowed estimation of the NAFTA dummy coefficient, quantifying NAFTA’s 
synchronizing or desynchronizing effects on state-level business cycle 
synchronization. To capture the effect of the border pre- and post-NAFTA, the 
NAFTA and border dummies were interacted with each other, and included in 
the pooled cross-sectional regression, creating the below regression model:
ρ I, J t = β0 + β1Agriculture sector similarity I, J t + β2Manufacturing sector similarity 
I, J t + β3Mining sector similarity I, J t  + β4ln(Population I t) + β5ln(Population J t) + 
β6ln(Distance I, J) + β7Border I, J + β8NAFtA t + β9(NAFtA t * Border I, J) + ε I, J t
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 For the pre-NAFTA sample regression function, all parameters are 
statistically significant at the 10% level, and all but manufacturing are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. All parameter estimates, minus manufacturing, take 
signs consistent with a priori expectations. The model explains a statistically 
significant portion of the variation in GSP correlation, with variation in the 
regressors explaining approximately 30% of the variation in GSP growth 
correlation. The Durbin-Watson statistic for the pre-NAFTA OLS estimates is 
calculated at 1.434. At n = 1,830 and with 8 regressors, we reject the null of no 
autocorrelation in the residual term, indicating that the residuals may follow 
an AR(1) process. The White test with cross terms confirms the presence 
of heteroskedasticity in the residual terms. The LM statistic equals 293.402, 
well past the critical value necessary to confirm unequal error variance. Since 
these tests show that heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are present with 
conventional standard errors, the Newey-West standard errors resolve this 
issue.  
 The empirical results for the regression model following NAFTA 
implementation change drastically relative to the pre-NAFTA estimates. 
The sample regression function explains a statistically significant portion of 
the variation in GSP growth correlation at the 1% level, with variation in the 
regressors accounting for approximately 16.1% of the variation in GSP growth 
correlation. The adjusted R2 of this model is considerably less than the 0.30 
adjusted R2 for the pre-NAFTA regression. The post-NAFTA regression’s 
Durbin-Watson test produces a d-statistic of 1.617. As before, the presence of 
an AR(1) process in the residual term is suggested, justifying use of the Newey-
West HAC covariance matrix. Inequality in the residual terms again seems 
likely, as the LG test value is 204.842, well past the critical value necessary to 
confirm heteroskedasticity in the original OLS residuals. The pooled model 
explains approximately 23% of the variation in GSP pair-wise correlation, and 
its Durbin-Watson and White test results again confirm the necessity of using 
Newey-West standard errors in the panel data regression.
 Agricultural sector similarity is the strongest trade determinant of pre-
NAFTA cycle correlation, with a 1% difference in the agriculture share of GSP 
between two territories weakening predicted cycle correlation by 1.55%. In the 
post-NAFTA regression, agriculture industry similarity weakens as a strong 
determinant of correlation, with the parameter estimate decreasing from 
-1.546 to -0.849. The estimate remains statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Agriculture structure similarity remains the strongest determinant of business 
cycle correlation in the panel model as well, with a parameter estimate of 
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-1.163. This estimate has a smaller magnitude than the pre-NAFTA estimate, 
but remains larger than the post-NAFTA estimate.
 Prior to NAFTA, mining industry similarity has a sizable effect on cycle 
correlation, with a 1% increase in mining sector dissimilarity lowering predicted 
growth correlation by 0.8%. Mining similarity weakens as a determinant of 
correlation after NAFTA ratification, with the parameter estimate shifting 
from -0.802 to -0.675, but remains statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
panel data model’s mining similarity parameter estimate increases to -0.720, 
compared to the post-NAFTA model’s estimate of -0.675. 
 Based solely on the pre- and post-NAFTA regression models, following 
NAFTA ratification, industry structure similarities in agriculture and mining 
weakened as determinants of state and provincial business cycle correlation. 
Additionally, manufacturing became a statistically significant determinant 
of cycle correlation in the post-NAFTA era. One possible explanation for 
the reduction in agriculture and mining similarity’s effects on business cycle 
correlation is that with increased economic integration between the US and 
Canada in the form of reduced trade barriers and tariffs, the transmission of 
industry-specific shocks was muted. Integration of goods and asset markets 
may create a more effective shock transmission mechanism, allowing a more 
complete dispersal of industry-specific shocks throughout all state-level 
economies, regardless of the level of industry structure similarity. Therefore, 
differences in agricultural and mining industry structure may not impact GSP 
growth correlation as strongly. 
 Manufacturing similarity has a statistically significant and synchronizing 
effect on states’ growth correlation. A 1% increase in the difference between 
manufacturing as share of two states’ GSP increases the predicted value of 
growth correlation by 0.12%. After NAFTA ratification, the parameter estimate 
on manufacturing takes the expected negative sign, and becomes strongly 
negative, with a 1% increase in manufacturing sector dissimilarity weakening 
predicted synchronization by 0.9%. The manufacturing variable’s parameter 
estimate decreases drastically from -0.990 in the post-NAFTA regression, to a 
statistically insignificant -0.093 in the panel data model. The small magnitude 
of the pre-NAFTA and panel estimates may indicate substantial market 
segmentation in manufactures trade prior to NAFTA, if dissimilarity in this 
sector only weakly impacts cycle synchronization. 
 NAFTA’s elimination of tariffs on motor vehicles, electronic products, and 
textiles led to an appreciable increase in intra-manufacturing trade between 
1994 and 2004. As the US and Canada witnessed a huge increase in trade 
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volume in these outputs, it is reasonable to argue that the once-segmented 
manufacturing sector became highly integrated, with substantial differences 
in manufacturing industry structure now strongly impacting GSP growth 
correlation. This would explain the shift in statistical significance and parameter 
signage in the pre- and post-NAFTA model, as well as the negative parameter 
estimate in the panel model. 
 Distance between the most populous cities has the expected substantial 
effect on correlation, with a 1% increase in distance between largest cities by 
territory weakening predicted correlation by 14%. Post NAFTA, the coefficient 
estimate on the distance variable decreases in magnitude, shifting upwards to 
-0.027. Following NAFTA ratification, physical distance between territories 
within the US and Canada weakens substantially as a desynchronizer of business 
cycle correlation. In the panel data model, the distance variable remains a 
strong determinant of cycle correlation, with a coefficient estimate of -0.084 
significant at the 1% level. With the technology boom of the 1990s, advances 
in telecommunications and transportation technologies enabled cheaper and 
faster transportation of tradable commodities, perhaps weakening distance’s 
effect on business cycle correlation. 
 Prior to NAFTA ratification, both population variables are statistically 
significant and positive at the 1% level as determinants of GSP growth 
correlation. After 1993, the population parameters shift in value considerably. 
The coefficient estimate on the population of territory I remains positive, but 
decreases from 0.107 to 0.044, and is now statistically significant only at the 
10% level. Territory J’s population strengthens as a determinant of business 
cycle correlation, increasing to 0.104, and remains statistically significant at the 
1% level. Within the pooled regression, the two population variables’ coefficient 
estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level, with correct signage and 
estimates close in value to those of the post-NAFTA estimates. Additionally, 
their coefficient values lie within .01 units of each other, unlike the previous 
regressions’ distance variables’ coefficients. 
 The post-NAFTA export variables produce contrasting results. Exports as 
a share of GSP for state I were a statistically significant determinant of business 
cycle correlation at the 1% level, with a 1% increase in exports as a share of 
state I’s GSP increasing cycle correlation by 1.1%. However, exports as a share 
of GSP for territory J was statistically insignificant at and beyond the 10% level. 
The coefficient on this variable was -0.118, indicating that for a 1% increase in 
exports as a share of territory J’s GSP, business cycle correlation between the two 
territories weakens by 0.12%. These estimates imply that a state’s own exports 
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as a share of GSP is more important in terms of its pair-wise synchronization 
with other territories, relative to other territories’ exports as a share of GSP.
 The pre-NAFTA border has a statistically significant and strong desynchronizing 
effect on state and provincial level cycle correlation. The border weakens the 
estimated value of pair-wise business cycle correlation by 20.5% in the pre-
NAFTA time period. The border dummy remains statistically significant at 
the 1% level in the post-NAFTA segment, and decreases in negativity to -0.18. 
Following NAFTA ratification, the geographical border weakens slightly in its 
capacity as a state-level desynchronizer. The panel model’s border coefficient 
is the largest of all three border estimates. All regressors held constant, the 
correlation of GDP growth between a province and a state is 31.4% weaker 
than the correlation of GDP growth between two provinces or two states. The 
negative parameter estimate on the NAFTA dummy indicates that post-NAFTA, 
GSP growth correlation between all territory pairings, intra- and international, 
decreases by 24.1%. Contrary to established literature, this analysis argues that 
NAFTA had a significantly disaggregating effect on regional economies. 
  Interacting the border dummy with the NAFTA dummy produces a term 
with a coefficient estimate of 0.177, statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Multivariate calculus reveals how this interaction term affects the economic 
interpretation of the border and NAFTA dummies. The partial derivative of 
the sample regression function with respect to the border is:
δ ρ i, J / δ Border i, J = -0.314 + (NAFtA * 0.177)
  Prior to NAFTA ratification, the correlation of GSP growth between a 
province and a state is weakened by 31.4%, relative to an intra-national territory 
pair. After NAFTA ratification, state-province GSP growth correlation weakens 
by only 13.7%. NAFTA ratification mitigates the desynchronizing force of the 
geographic border to some extent.
 The partial derivative of the SRF with respect to NAFTA is:
δ ρ i, J / δ NAFtA i, J = -0.241 + (0.177 * Border)
  NAFTA weakens intra-national pairs’ GSP growth correlation by 24.1%. 
For state-province pairs, NAFTA weakens GSP growth correlation by only 6.4%. 
While NAFTA had a highly desynchronizing effect on intra-national pairs, its 
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effect is much weaker on state-province pairs. One valid argument against this 
analysis is the question of whether a similarly important economic event in the 
1990s strongly impacted US-Canada goods trade, and the NAFTA and border 
dummies are simply absorbing that event’s effects into their estimates. While 
the possibility exists that other events occurring from 1984 to 2004 impacted 
pair-wise GSP growth correlation, the likelihood is that inter-territorial trade 
is the main explanatory variable influencing pair-wise GSP growth correlation. 
The scatter-grams on the following page corroborate this assertion. Within 
these graphs, we clearly see a positive relationship between exports as a share 
of GSP and business cycle correlation. 
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Figure 1. scatter-plot of exports as a share 
of state I’s GsP in relation to GsP growth 
correlation. Note the positive trend in the 
scatter-plot.
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Figure 2. scatter-plot of exports as a share of 
territory J’s GsP in relation to GsP growth 
correlation. Here the trend is less clear, but 
there remains a positive trend between the two 
variables.
Conclusions
 The border reduces cross-border pairs’ GSP growth correlation by 
anywhere from 18% to 31%. Despite substantial trade integration, state and 
province pairs’ GSP growth remains strongly desynchronized. Disparities 
in taxation and trade regulations may remain, functioning as a disincentive 
for trans-border goods trade. Home market bias may also influence US and 
Canadian firms’ decisions to trade. The border’s geographic and legal effects 
remain an obstacle to business cycle synchronization. Yet in relation to NAFTA, 
the border had a synchronizing effect. Via partial derivative analysis, the border 
increases the predicted level of cross-border pairs’ GSP growth correlation, 
reducing NAFTA’s strongly desynchronizing effects. With the elimination of 
virtually all economic barriers to cross-border trade, it is reasonable to conclude 
that the doubling of goods trade between states and provinces over a ten-year 
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period reduced NAFTA’s impact on business cycle correlation between states 
and provinces. GSP growth correlation between cross-border pairs weakens 
by 31.4%, prior to NAFTA ratification. Post-NAFTA, GSP growth correlation 
between cross-border pairs weakens by only 13.7%. While NAFTA may have 
desynchronized intra-national pairs, its effect is much weaker in international 
pairings.
 In the panel data regression, NAFTA alone was found to desynchronize 
territory pairings by 24.1%. In a vacuum, this might be used as evidence to 
argue the notion that free trade agreements are inherently desynchronizing. 
The trade agreement may have had a desynchronizing effect by inducing states 
and provinces to specialize in specific industries, per the Ricardian theory 
of comparative advantage. With different territories specializing in different 
industries, industry-specific shocks would no longer produce symmetrical 
responses within state-level economies. It appears that NAFTA’s primary effect 
was to generate simultaneous business cycle desynchronization between state-
province pairs, state-state pairs, and province-province pairs. Though NAFTA 
had the synchronizing effect of integrating multiple sectors of the goods market 
of both nations, its desynchronizing effect also decoupled domestic economies 
from within. NAFTA was ratified at the same time the border’s relevance as a 
desynchronizing force was reduced, due to tariffs and trade barriers, coupled 
with advances in transportation and telecommunications technology. These 
two events opened up new markets for states and provinces with economies 
centered on industries producing tradable output. As a consequence of the 
Ricardian law of comparative advantage, states found themselves trading more 
with provinces whose economic structures matched their own, and thus the 
desynchronizing effects of NAFTA were reduced to some effect, although not 
completely negated. This reinforces the notion that business cycle shocks are 
industry driven, as opposed to demand driven.
 One theory to explain the mechanisms of the post-NAFTA environment 
is the following: NAFTA ratification lowered barriers to increased goods 
trade, inducing territories to specialize in differing industries. As a result, the 
NAFTA induced desynchronization between territory pairs. However, those 
states specializing in identical industries witnessed such an increase in intra-
industrial trade that a net synchronization was created in those pairs. Cycles may 
be becoming more industry-driven, and what is being witnessed post-NAFTA 
is the generation of industry cycles that territories are tied to. This theory 
accounts for the regression results and the positive trend between exports as a 
share of GSP and business cycle synchronization. At an aggregate level, NAFTA 
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can desynchronize pairs by spurring trade specialization, but also induce 
trade creation that creates industry-driven business cycle synchronization, 
partially negating the decoupling. Post-NAFTA, GSP growth correlation both 
intra-nationally and internationally has decoupled. Further empirical work is 
forthcoming. Gravity model variables will be added, including transportation 
expenditures as a share of two territories’ combined gross product. With this, 
we can determine the effect transportation technology has on synchronizing 
economic growth. More sectors of the economy producing tradable output will 
be also be considered. 
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the Genetic, social, & Behavioral Factors 
that Motivate Parents 
to Abuse their Children 
Brad Garner
Introduction
 This paper examines the influence of economic, genetic, behavioral, and 
social factors on the parental choice to abuse one’s child.  I derive a choice 
model for the parents based on McFadden’s (1974) conditional logit model. 
Within society, the parent or parents not only bear the responsibility for their 
child’s well being, but also for ensuring the child will grow up to be an educated, 
productive member of society.  Through the examination of individual parent 
and child behavior patterns, as well as numerous social and economic factors 
from the Physical Violence in American Families Survey of 1985, I show that 
after a child behaves in a certain manner, the parent chooses to abuse based 
on numerous social, economic, and genetic variables.  Child abuse is a social 
problem that has not been examined heavily in the field of economics, but with 
the help of econometric analysis I examine how behavior and social trends 
can increase the probability of child abuse.  Hopefully this analysis will lead to 
suggestions on how to remedy this problem.
 In the next section I show how other studies have approached similar 
problem and their findings.  After the presentation of the literature I explain 
my parental choice model and what factors influence this model.  Following the 
presentation of the model I discuss the data from the survey and what variables 
were used and how they have been modified.  I then use the data to support 
my theory and conclude with a discussion about what factors influence the 
parental choice to abuse. 
Literature 
 Several scholars examine poverty and family economic status to see if 
income level is a deciding factor in child abuse.  These studies argue that lower 
income levels increase parental stress level (as parents have a harder time 
making ends meet), thus making parents more likely to use abuse (Berger 2004, 
725-748; Drake and Pandey 1996, 1003-1018; Egeland 1979, 269; Gil 1970; 
Iverson and Segal 1990; Medora, Wilson, and Larson 2001, 335-348; Straus 
1979, 213).  This is also confirmed by numerous studies which find that the 
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presence of neglect is also highly influenced by poverty (Finkelhor and Jones 
2006, 685-716; Paxson and Waldfogel 2003, 85-113).  One can see that this is 
a logical argument as poverty can lead to a higher parent stress level.  Higher 
stress levels may lead to loss in self-control, resulting in abuse (Herrenkohl, 
Herrenkohl, and Egolf 1983, 424-431).  My study examines multiple income 
levels in order to see which ones are more prone to abuse.  
 Abuse history is another factor that is found to increase the risk that this 
parent uses violence with their own children (Gil 1970; Iverson and Segal 
1990; Straus 1979, 213).  Other parental characteristics found to influence 
abuse are: age, gender, family structure, education, ethnicity, and family 
structure (Gil 1970).  Substance abuse is another key factor that may increase 
the probability of abuse occurring (Gil 1970; Markowitz and Grossman 1998). 
Parental expectations for the child as well as parental understanding (or 
misunderstanding) of child behavior are factors parents do control.  
 A child may behave in a certain manner, regardless of intent, and this act 
or actions may be interpreted by the parent as negative behavior (Gil 1970; 
Herrenkohl, Herrenkohl, and Egolf 1983, 424-431; de Lissovoy, Vladimir, Dr. 
1979, 341).  Parent reaction can be determined by numerous traits such as 
those discussed earlier, but also variables such as personality which can not be 
quantified accurately.  Thus, the child’s behavior must also be considered in the 
pool of variables that determine abuse (Lynch 1976, 43).  
 Mammen et al. (2003) examines how parental cognitions and satisfaction1 
lead to child abuse.  This study hypothesizes that parental expectations for the 
child, inability to control parenting situations, and “hostile attribution bias” 
(parents perceiving innocent child behavior as intentionally hostile) would all 
lead to increased parental frustration and in turn child abuse (Mammen, Kolko, 
and Pilkonis 2003, 288).  The examination finds that none of these factors 
contributed to aggressive parent behavior, suggesting that child maltreatment 
is rather derived from parental satisfaction with the child (Mammen, Kolko, 
and Pilkonis 2003, 288).  This study suggests an interesting point about the 
degree of abuse that is used.  If a parent is more or less satisfied with their 
child, they may be more likely to use higher levels of violence (dissatisfied), or 
lower levels of violence (more satisfied), assuming the parent abuses. Egeland 
(1979), presents the contradictory argument that inadequate mothers do not 
understand their own children or the process of child development.  If a mother 
1 Parental cognitions considered by the study are unrealistic expectations for the child by the parent, if the parent   
 feels they have a lack of power in care giving situations (thus making them feel “threatened”), and if the parent   
	 interprets	innocent	child	behavior	as	malicious.		Satisfaction	refers	to	how	satisfied	the	parent	is	with	the	child.
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does not understand their own child, how can they understand the reasoning 
behind a certain behavior? 
 In his construction of an equilibrium model for child development, 
Akabayashi notes that parents may have lofty expectations for their children and 
that the children may never live up to these expectations.  The parents are then 
forced to relieve their frustrations through abuse (Akabayashi 2006, 993-1025). 
The construction of this model takes into account the child’s human capital, the 
effort of the child, and the parenting strategy, all of which lead to a relationship 
where the parent provides services to develop the human capital of the child 
(Akabayashi 2006, 993-1025).   Also taken into account is the amount of time 
the parent spends with the child, which can lead to a more accurate perception 
of child behavior, lessening parental frustration when a child behaves a certain 
way (Akabayashi 2006, 993-1025).  Agee, Crocker, & Shogen present a similar 
model where abuse is a result of a loss of self control or loss of self composure 
by the parent (Agee, Crocker, and Shogren 2004, 1-39). 
 The status (adopted, foster, etc.) of the child is another factor that should, 
but does not seem to increase the probability of child abuse (Gelles and 
Harrop, 1991).  This study found, using empirical analysis of the National 
Family Violence Survey, that non-genetic children were actually abused less 
than genetic children (Gelles and Harrop, 1991).  It is also interesting to point 
out that abortion has led to a decline in child abuse rates.  Assuming biological 
children who are unwanted are more likely to be abused; abortion eliminates 
this problem (M. P. Bitler & Zavodny, 2004; M. P. Bitler & Zavodny, 2002).   
 From the reviewed works it seems that there is a combination of factors, 
rather than individual factors, leading to abuse. (Gil 1970; Straus 1979, 213). 
Parental frustration with the child and the parents stress level are two factors 
that should increase the probability of abuse.  Each individual parent has a 
different breaking point.  Some parents snap under low levels of frustration or 
stress and some parents are more patient.  My study shows there is not only 
a wide combination of factors, but that child behavior is the inciting factor 
for the use of abuse.   The literature reviewed demonstrates that numerous 
environmental and genetic factors may come into play, but few demonstrate the 
importance of behavior empirically.  The studies presented here also emphasize 
that the decision to abuse falls on the parent who is subject to numerous social 
and genetic constraints.  My study not only examines more environmental and 
genetic factors, but also argues that the constraints on the parent influence the 
decision to abuse when the child behaves a certain way.  Unlike any other study 
I also present a parental choice structure for the parent to abuse.   
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Theory
 Again, my question is: Given the presence of certain types of child 
behaviors, what parental factors determine whether or not a parent will abuse 
their child?  My hypothesis is that certain factors exist; genetically, socially, and 
behaviorally, for a given parent and a given child that increase the probability 
of abuse. A key part of this argument is parental utility and the factors that 
determine it.  This is important as it allows me to present child abuse as a 
derivation of McFadden’s conditional choice model.  The utility of parent p (up) 
is determined by not only by child utility (uc), but also by the child’s well being 
(CWB), thus:
        (1)
 Child utility is determined by the child’s happiness, as a child is happiness 
translates to parental happiness (Akabayashi 2006, 993-1025).  Child well being 
is defined as the action by the parent which is in the best interest of the child. 
An example of this is child vaccinations.  Children may hate getting inoculated 
for diseases such as polio, but it is necessary to prevent the child from 
contracting this disease.  I assume that children, especially the younger ones, 
do not completely comprehend the difference between good and bad behavior, 
as some children may find bad behavior utility maximizing.  Assuming this 
argument is true, parents can not always allow their children to maximize 
their utility as it may be detrimental to the child as well as others.  Abuse is 
assumed to be detrimental to the child both in utility and in well being, thus it 
is also detrimental to overall parental utility (Agee, Crocker, and Shogren 2004, 
1-39).  
 Further, each parent faces a discrete choice, to abuse (a) or not to abuse (na), 
and selects the choice that maximizes utility (Manski 2001, 217).  Assuming that 
the parents behave rationally they make the choice not to abuse:
   
  (2)
But because child abuse does occur, some parents are not acting completely 
rationally:
             (3)
This is the probability that parent p has the utility function where abuse is the 
optimal choice (Manski 2001, 217).  
),( CWBufu cp =
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 Considering these assumptions, I now present the following decision 
tree to illustrate the choice structure of the parent (Figure 1).  Child behavior 
is the first node on the decision tree.  The child has two choices, good and 
bad behavior.  The behavior classification is determined by the parent, due 
to the assumption previously mentioned about some children not knowing 
the difference between good and bad behaviors.  In reality there are shades 
of gray with child behavior, but for this purpose I assume the parent sees it 
either as good or bad.  The parent must then decide how to act based on their 
interpretation of the child’s actions.  The parent has three choices: no response, 
abuse, or other response (i.e. praise, or other punishment).  Before I continue I 
need to note that much of this decision is determined by parental perception. 
The parent may see a child’s behavior as malicious, but when in reality the child 
meant no harm (Mammen, Kolko, and Pilkonis 2003, 288).  
 The parent’s decision (PD) of what reaction to use, given the presence of a 
certain type of child behavior (B), is defined by the function: 
        (4)
 Where PP is parental personality, PE is parental expectations, PG is 
parent gender, PA is parent age, CG and CA are the gender of age of the child 
respectively, PAH is the parent’s abuse history, PAU is the parent’s alcohol use, 
PR is the race of the parent, PI is parental income level, PES is the parent’s 
emotional status, FS is the family structure, PPL is parental problems with the 
law, PPS is the pregnancy status of the female parent, CI is the intentions of 
the child from the parent’s perspective, and N is a variable representing other 
factors in the parent’s life that are determined by nature.  This can be expressed 
in terms of McFadden’s conditional logit model.
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 Before I present my choice model with this I must note that while 
McFadden’s rational choice model may not make sense in this context as abuse 
is not a rational choice, the basis of this model makes the most sense in this 
context.  Abuse is not always a choice parent’s consciously make, instincts and 
other factors come into play.  While this may hold true for the majority of 
cases; I am attempting to show that when parents choose to abuse there are 
factors that make the parent choose abuse, even if the choice is sub-conscious. 
The following utility functions serve as the foundation for McFadden’s 
conditional logit model and are derived from Manski (2001), Maddala (1983), 
and McFadden (1974, 1980).
   (5)
 Equation 5 shows the utility for parent p ( )(au p ) when this parent 
chooses to abuse their child can be expressed in terms of a vector of attributes 
which characterize the child who is abused (ca), and a vector which classifies 
the characteristics of the individual parent (pp) (Manski 2001, 217).  However 
one can only use observed values, thus the equation becomes:
    (6)
),()( pap pcuau =
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where cao and ppo represent the observed vectors for the abused child and 
parent who chooses abuse respectively.  In Equation 6 the error expresses any 
unobserved attributes to utility (Manski 2001, 217).
 Equation 6 can be transformed into a conditional choice probability 
model:
      (7)
 Where Ao is the observed attributes of the abused child, including behavior. 
This model shows the probability of parent p selecting the choice not to abuse, 
given a set of child characteristics (Manski 2001, 217).   Equation 7 leads to the 
conditional logit model:
 Y*pa= The level of indirect utility if a given parent chooses to abuse
 Ypa   = 1  If the parent chooses to abuse
 Ypa  = 0  otherwise
 Using the previous equation I further assume:
 
 Thus this becomes:  
(Maddala 1983; McFadden 1974, 1980)      (8)
 This equation is derived by McFadden and shows the probability that parent 
p with attributes p, makes the choice to abuse given the child with attributes c 
exhibits a certain behavior (B).  From this conditional choice model I show that 
when the parent decides to abuse, the decision is determined by a set of parent 
and child characteristics.  These characteristics should be present in parents 
who consciously choose to abuse, and parents who “lose control” and do not 
consciously choose to abuse their children.  I also show the importance utility 
plays in this model.  Again, regardless of whether the parent consciously makes 
the choice to abuse, parental utility from abuse is determined after the abuse 
occurs.
 Child behavior is the condition for this model.  I believe the probability of 
abuse increases when a child exhibits a negative behavior.  Due to restrictions 
in the data I am only to take into account three behaviors that have the good/
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bad distinction.  It is important to note that the decision of how to react to 
child behavior occurs only at time t, even though some of the variables which 
affect this decision are determined at an earlier time.   The three variables 
are: if the child has a temper tantrum, if the child has disciplinary problems 
at school, and if the child is failing school.  Temper tantrums are defined by 
the National Library of Medicine as “disruptive or undesirable behaviors or 
emotional outbursts displayed in response to unmet needs or desires.  [Temper 
tantrums] may also refer to an inability to control emotions due to frustration 
or difficulty expressing a particular need or desire” (Medline Plus 2008, 2).  The 
definitions of the other behavior variables are self explanatory. If the child has 
temper tantrums or disciplinary problems at home it should signal good or bad 
behavior, and also suggest if the presence of a certain behavior increases the 
probability of abuse.  The failing school variable tests if parental expectations 
do factor into the use abuse.  Summary statistics and cross tabulations for 
these variables can be found in Appendix A.  In order to determine how these 
behaviors impact the explanatory variables, interaction terms were created.  
 Referring back to Figure 1, the parent’s decision has three outcomes 
depending on the behavior.  They are: no response, some other response (i.e. 
praise or form of punishment that is not abuse), or abuse.  If the parent chooses 
abuse, they select from three forms: minor, severe or very severe.  These are 
defined as follows (Straus and Gelles 1990):
Minor violence- threw something at another family member, pushed, •	
grabbed, shoved, or spanked.
Severe Violence- kicked, bit, punched, hit or tried to hit with object, •	
beat up, choked, burned, scalded, threatened with a knife or gun, used 
knife or gun.
Very Severe Violence- Created to account for actions other than hitting •	
a child with an object (i.e. a belt) which is sometimes considered part 
of traditional punishment
This decision is defined by a similar equation as the initial parental decision 
(Eq. 4), only it now determines the type of violence on the condition that the 
parent chooses to abuse.
 Based on the assumptions of my model, parent’s do not want to abuse 
their children as it is detrimental to both the parent and the child in terms 
of utility and child well being.  In the decision tree, the choice to abuse is the 
least optimal given a certain child behavior.  “No Response” is not the optimal 
choice either as it does not reinforce good behaviors, or attempt to correct bad 
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behaviors.  Other is the optimal choice as it encourages good behavior through 
praise, and corrects bad behavior through an optimal form of punishment. 
However, as noted earlier many parents do not consciously make the choice 
to abuse.  This is where my theory about parents choosing to abuse based on 
utility breaks down.  While theory can not perfectly predict parental behavior, 
my results show what characteristics modify the probability of abuse.  I propose 
that children, who are exposed to abuse, not only behave a certain way, but also 
are raised by parents which have certain markers for child abuse.  
 In order to do this I predict multiple regressions. First I use a logit model as 
my dependent variable is binary.  The behavior interaction terms demonstrate 
how certain independent variables change the probability of abuse, when the 
behaviors are present.  Summary statistics for the interaction terms that are 
statistically significant from the non-interaction terms are in Appendix A. 
The first set of predictions include my independent variables as well as the 
significant interaction terms.  I also present odds-ratios with this prediction. 
Odds ratios are interpreted as difference from one, and show how the variables 
affect the odds of abuse being present.  After determining what factors affect 
the probability a given parent chooses to abuse, I predict a second logit model, 
ordinal in nature, to determine what type of violence the parent will use 
(summary statistics in Appendix A).  I use an ordered logit as my dependent 
variable is ordinal in nature and it allows me to predict what characteristics, 
including the behavior interaction terms, increase the likelihood of a parent 
choosing a certain type of violence. The results of these predictions show 
what characteristics increase the likelihood of a parent using a higher level 
of violence.  The cut-values demonstrate where the dependent variables are 
divided for each level of violence.  I now discuss my initial expectations for the 
independent variables which are derived from reviewed literature as well as 
cross-tabulations
 I expect the gender of the respondent variable to be positive, signaling that 
females are be more likely to abuse.  This is grounded in the idea that females 
spend more time taking care of children, creating more opportunities to abuse 
than males.  I predict the age of the respondent to be negative, as younger 
parents are less experienced and turn to abuse as a disciplinary solution 
than more experienced parents. I expect child age to be negative, as younger 
children are more likely to be abused as they require more care from the parent 
as increased needs may cause parental frustration, thus leading to abuse.  The 
cross-tabulations show that as child age increases the number of abuse cases 
decreases.  This also may be due to the fact older children can defend themselves 
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more effectively.  Parent age and child age are somewhat correlated as younger 
parents most likely have younger children.  I expect child gender to be negative, 
signaling male children are more likely to be abused, as male children are more 
prone to bad behavior.  The behavior interaction term is not significant from 
the non-interacted gender variable.  This demonstrates that behavior is a factor 
in the non-interacted term, asserting my initial expectation.  
 I so not expect parents who were exposed to domestic violence as a child 
to be more likely to abuse.  I think domestic violence breeds more domestic 
violence, not more child abuse.  If the respondent was abused by either of their 
parents when they were children, I expect the respondent to be more likely to 
use abuse.  This is derived from the idea that abuse lead to more abuse.  If the 
respondent has been arrested in the previous year there are two possibilities: the 
parent is in jail, away from the child, and unable to abuse; or because the parent 
has broken the law, they may be more violent than other parents.  A former 
convict as a parent may also have missed a significant portion of a child’s life 
and this could increase parental frustration.  There are two possibilities with 
alcohol consumption: parents either become more violent under the influence 
or more tolerant depending on the manner in which alcohol affects them.  The 
cross-tabulations show that there are more cases of abuse than non-abuse as 
the number of drinks per day increases.
 Asserting the beliefs of the literature I believe that parents who feel 
stressed, depressed, or have thought about suicide are more likely to abuse 
as stress is a factor that may cause parents to snap, leading to more abuse.  I 
also have parallel expectations with the literature when it comes to income 
levels.  I predict that lower income levels should increase the probability of 
abuse.  For the race variables, I could argue minority races are more or less 
likely to abuse, but there is no plausible theory to support either argument.  I 
think the results of the race estimates may be proxies for other variables that 
have not been included in this model, such as education level and employment 
status.  If the respondent is pregnant I expect a higher probability of abuse, 
as pregnant women are assumed to be under more stress (physically and 
emotionally) than other parents and therefore be more likely to turn to abuse. 
Unlike the reviewed literature, if the family is a step or single parent family, I 
expect to see a positive relationship. I expect this with step families because 
one parent is not biological and may be more likely to abuse a child that is not 
theirs.  Single parent families typically struggle to make ends meet; therefore, 
my reasoning for this is similar to my argument for income level.  Finally, with 
the child behavior interaction terms, I expect these to show that parents with 
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certain characteristics to be more likely to abuse their child given the presence 
of a certain child behavior.
Data
 The ideal data for a study such as this would be statistics about every case of 
child abuse and the environments in which each case occurred.  While this data 
is over twenty years old, I do not feel this makes a difference.  Unfortunately, 
some variables that may make a parent use abuse, such as emotion, are not 
easily quantified.    I believe that the genetic and demographic variables that 
contribute to abuse have not changed significantly over time.   Since child 
abuse is an illegal activity, data only exists about reported cases, I examine 
those cases to see if there are any consistencies among cases.  
 The data come from the 1985 Physical Violence in American Families 
Survey.  This survey was a follow up to a similar survey done in 1976.  “The 
main component of this survey design was a national cross-sectional survey 
of adults in the United States who either (1) were currently married or living 
together, (2) were single parents with children under 18 in the household, or 
(3) had been married or had lived with a partner of the opposite sex within the 
past two years” (Codebook).  The dependent variables are considered Conflict 
Tactics Scale Violence Rate Variables which are divided into three types 
of violence, minor, severe, and very severe (Straus and Gelles 1990).  These 
variables were manipulated to create a single variable, if abuse was present at 
all regardless of type, and a scale variable for the type of violence.  The majority 
of the independent variables are dummy variables denoting either specific 
responses (i.e. 1=female and 0=male) or certain levels, such as income and the 
amount of drinks people consume.  Again, more in depth data definitions are 
contained in Appendix A.  
 The data do present some limitations in my attempt to produce results. 
The survey has 6,002 observations.  With the numerous manipulations of the 
data, some variables lack significant observations to be considered accurate. 
This is reflected in the dependent variables. Out of the people who answered 
the abuse questions, 60% said they abuse.  This is possible, but I feel with more 
observations, this number might decline. Survey form also naturally draws into 
question the validity of the answers.  People could easily give false answers and 
I see some examples of this present in the summary statistics.  I find it highly 
unlikely someone can consume 40 drinks in one day.  Thus, the results produced 
in this study must be interpreted with caution.  This survey is one of the better 
sources of statistics that show the factors that contribute to child abuse.  No 
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other survey has the depth of possibly significant independent variables than 
this survey.  It provides a more accurate picture when the independent and 
dependent variables are each from the same source.  
 From the summary statistics table in Appendix A I find the majority of the 
independent variables have upwards of the 6,002 observations.  This is important 
as a relationship is established from the 3,338 observations for the dependent 
variables.  The reasons for the significantly lower number of observations 
for the dependent variables is due to the fact there were numerous missing 
observations in the study.  This occurs when the answer was “unknown” as 
opposed to “no” or “yes”.    It should be noted that numerous dummy variables 
were generated.  The stressed, depressed, thought about suicide, income, race 
and family status variables all had to be converted into dummy variables for the 
different responses on the survey.    
results
 The results for the initial model, determining what characteristics predict 
the probability abuse is present, is divided into three separate predictions. 
These results can be found in Table 1 (Standard errors in parenthesis, *denotes 
significance at 10% level, **denotes significance at 5% level, ***denotes 
significance at the 1% level, OR: odds ratio: maintains same significance as 
coefficient estimate)2.  The first model (1) is my prediction with the temper 
tantrum (TT) interaction terms.  The second model (2) is the prediction with 
the failing (FS) school interaction terms.  Finally, the third model (3) is the 
model with the disciplinary problems (DP) at home interaction terms.  The 
interactions terms demonstrate the effect of the given characteristic with the 
presence of the given behavior.  The effect on the odds ratio is also reported. 
For interpretation purposes the closer the odds ratio is to 1, there is little or no 
change.   
2	 	Note	–	both	of	the	coefficient	estimates	for	interactions	terms	for	Hispanic	and	drinks	per	day	were	statistically	
	 significant	in	difference	from	zero	at	the	10%	level.		Both	being	Hispanic	and	consuming	more	drinks	per	day	
	 lowers	the	log-odds	for	abuse,	holding	constant	the	influence	of	other	variables.		These	estimates	are	not	very	
 reliable, but are interesting especially the one concerning alcohol use, as it supports the idea parents may be 
 more tolerant given a certain child behavior.
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 These results provide some interesting answers to my initial hypothesis. 
All models are statistically significant, as can be seen from the LR-stat.  Each 
model also has a Pseudo R2 of about .1.  Each model also predicts about 70% 
correctly.  I find across the models there are some variables which consistently 
contribute to a change in the probability that a parent abuses.  These variables 
are important as they signal that a parent’s probability of abuse changes 
regardless of the presence of certain behaviors.  All of the following estimates 
are statistically significant in difference from zero (most at the 1% level of 
significance), across all models, they are:
Parent Gender (positive) - being female increases the log-odds of •	
abuse by about .4, holding constant the influence of other independent 
variables.  Being female also increase the odds of abuse by about .5. 
This is parallel with initial expectations.
Parent Age (negative) - for each additional year of age, the log-odds of •	
the parent using abuse decreases by about .019, holding constant the 
influence of other variables.  As the parent gets older the odds of abuse 
decrease by .02 for each year.   This is on par with a priori expectations 
that younger parents are more likely to abuse.
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Child Age (negative) – for each additional year of age, the log odds of •	
the child being abused decreases by about .91, holding constant the 
influence of other variables.  The odds-ratio decreases by about .09, 
for each additional year in age the child gains.  This is also consistent 
with initial expectations that younger children are more likely to be 
exposed to abuse.
Child Gender (negative) - being a female child, instead of a male, •	
decreases the log-odds of abuse by about .092, holding constant the 
influence of other variables.  If the child is female, the odds of abuse 
decrease by about .09.  This agrees with initial expectations that males 
are more likely to be abused.
Abuse History (positive) - if a parent was abused by their own parents •	
as a teen (as opposed to not being abused), mother or father, the log-
odds of abuse increases by about .3, holding constant the influence 
of other variables.  If a parent was abused by their own parents, the 
odds of abuse increases by about .34.  This is consistent with a-priori 
expectations.
Depression (positive) - if the parent has ever felt depressed, as opposed •	
to never feeling depressed, the log-odds of abuse increase by about 
.3383, holding constant the influence of other variables.  If the parent 
is depressed the odds of abuse increase by about .4.  This was my initial 
expectation as well.  
 These coefficient estimates for these variables demonstrate that there are 
certain factors outside of one’s control that serve as markers for a parent to abuse. 
These results demonstrate that the biological and family history factors that 
influence a parent’s choice to abuse no matter how the child behaves.  I now present 
the statistically significant interaction terms from the first set of predictions.  
 I am only discussing the interaction estimates that are statistically 
significant in difference from zero at the 5% level of significance or better:
Child Age (Discipline Problems Interaction) – In children who have •	
disciplinary problems at home; each additional year in age decreases 
the log-odds of abuse by about .17, holding constant the influence of 
other variables.  Also for each year older the child with disciplinary 
problems is, the odds of abuse decrease by .164.   This is again 
consistent with initial expectations that younger children, especially 
those with disciplinary problems are more likely to be abused.
Respondent’s Mother hit their Father (Failing School Interaction) - •	
If the parent’s mother hit the parent’s father and the child is failing 
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school, the log-odds of abuse decreases by 1.192, holding constant the 
influence of other variables.  This may not be an accurate prediction, 
due to a small sample issue.  There are only 28 observations where 
abuse was present and the respondent’s mother hit the respondent’s 
father.  
Abuse History (Hit by Father – Failing School interaction) - If a parent •	
was abused by their father and the child is failing school, the log-odds 
of abuse increase by 1.329, holding constant the influence of other 
variables.  Also if a parent was abused, and has a child failing school 
the odds of abuse increase by 2.778.  These results are parallel with 
initial expectations and somewhat higher than the non-interacted 
term.  This may reflect the parental expectations concept.
Low Income ($0 to $10,000 – Temper Tantrum Interaction) – If the •	
family does not make more than $10,000 and the child has a temper 
tantrum, the log odds of abuse increase by 2.19, holding constant the 
influence of other variables.  If a parent makes less than $10,000 and has 
a child that acts out, the odds of abuse increase by 7.937.  This is the only 
time any income estimate is statistically significant.  I find that income is 
only a factor when the child misbehaves or annoys the parent, assuming 
temper tantrums are perceived in this way by the parent.
Parent Stress Level (Failing School Interaction) – If a parent feels •	
stressed and has a child failing school, the log-odds for abuse increase 
by 2.33, holding constant the influence of other variables.  These 
conditions also increase the odds of abuse by 9.314.  This is the only 
time the stress level of the parent was significant, showing that certain 
behaviors (i.e. failing to meet expectations) may trigger a parent to 
abuse when they are stressed.  
 From these significant interaction terms; I find that when a child behaves a 
certain way or fails to meet parental expectations, there are other factors (besides 
the previously discussed biological factors, which change the probability that a 
parent chooses to abuse.  Now that I have shown what factors lead a parent to 
choose abuse, what factors influence the decision as to what type of violence to 
use?  
 The results of the interacted ordered logit models are presented in Table 
2 (Standard errors in parenthesis, *denotes significance at 10% level, **denotes 
significance at 5% level, ***denotes significance at the 1% level).  These models 
show what variables influence a parent’s choice to use minor, severe, or very 
severe violence.
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 All three of these predictions are statistically significant in difference from 
zero with pseudo R2’s around.06. From the interacted ordered logit predictions 
I find the following coefficient estimates of non-interacted variables to be 
statistically significant in difference from zero across all three models (All of 
these estimates are statistically significant in difference from zero at least at the 
10% level):
Parent Gender (positive) – Being a female parent, as opposed to •	
being a male parent, increases the probability that that parent turns 
to a higher level of violence, holding constant the influence of other 
variables.   Females are not only more prone to abuse but also more 
prone to use higher levels of violence. 
Parent Age (negative) – As the parent gets older, the probability the •	
selected parent uses higher levels of violence decreases, holding the 
influence of other variables constant.
Child Age & Child Gender (negative) – As the child gets older, the •	
probability they are exposed to higher levels of violence decreases, 
holding constant the influence of other variables.  If the child is 
female, the probability that child is found in higher violence category 
also decreases, holding constant the influence of other variables.
Abuse History (positive) – Parents who were abused by either parent •	
as a teenager are more likely to use higher levels of violence, holding 
the influence of other variables constant.  
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Race of the Parent: Black (positive) – If the respondent is African-•	
American they are more likely to use higher levels of violence, holding 
constant the influence of other variables.
Depression & Attempted Suicide (positive) – If a parent is depressed •	
or has thought about killing themselves, that parent is more likely to 
use more higher levels of violence, holding constant the influence of 
other variables.
 I again find many genetic and family history variables to be influential in 
increasing or decreasing the probability that higher violence levels are present. 
Many of the variables which determined the probability a parent uses abuse also 
determine the probability for a certain level of violence.  Race and Depression 
have also come into play here.  Race is another genetic trait that can not be 
controlled but may be serving as an indicator for income or education here. 
After checking correlation between race and other variables, I only found that 
race is somewhat correlated with low levels of income.  One could easily argue 
that depression could be a predetermined disorder or a result of events in ones 
life.  Either way, I expect this variable to make a parent more violent.  I now 
present the significant coefficient estimates for the interacted variables.
 The following variables are all interaction terms; showing how the presence 
of child behavior affects the decision of what type of abuse to use.  All are 
significant at least at the 10% level of significance.  
Parent Age (Temper Tantrum & Failing School Interaction) – When a •	
child either has a temper tantrum or fails in school, each year older the 
parent is increases the probability that the parent uses higher levels of 
violence, holding constant the influence of other variables.  Younger 
parents are more likely to abuse and use higher levels when behavior 
is not considered, yet when behavior is a factor, the older parents are 
more likely to use higher levels of violence.
Domestic Abuse Experience (Failing School Interaction) – I again •	
find a contradictory relationship when behavior is factored in.  In the 
failing school model, if the respondent’s mother hit their father, this 
parent is more likely to use higher levels of violence, holding constant 
the influence of other variables.  However, parents who have had this 
experience along with children who are failing school, are actually 
likely to use lower levels of violence of none at all.  Again, I think this 
is a small sample issue.  
Abuse History (Failing School Interaction) – A parent who was •	
abused by their father and has a child who is failing school is more 
69
likely to use higher levels of violence, holding constant the influence 
of other variables.  This is again consistent with initial expectations 
about abuse history.
Stressed (Failing School Interaction) – Parents who feel stressed •	
and have children who are failing school are more highly likely to 
use higher levels of violence, holding constant the influence of other 
variables.  This is consistent with initial expectations.
Child Failing School (negative) – Children who are simply failing are •	
subjected to lower levels of violence or no violence, holding constant 
the influence of other variables.
 The coefficient estimates for these statistically significant interaction 
terms demonstrate that behavior, especially if the child is failing in school, 
can dramatically alter what factors go into determining the level of violence 
choice the parent faces.  While some of the variables are genetic, or based 
on experiences which could not be controlled; the interaction terms again 
demonstrate that factors such as stress factor into the decision about what kind 
of abuse a parent uses. 
interpretation of results
 From the results I find, based on the data from The Physical Violence in 
American Families Survey of 1984, the decision to abuse is based primarily 
on genetics and abuse history.  Factors such as age and gender, both of the 
parent and the child, seem to be important factors in determining if parents 
abuse.  Younger parents have younger children, and are less experienced.  Also 
younger children can be a handful for these inexperienced parents and people 
have been known to snap when overwhelmed with frustration.  Parental anger 
with a difficult child, sometimes results in abuse (Frude and Goss 1979, 331). 
Abuse history played a role in not only determining abuse, but also what kind 
of abuse, and how intense that abuse would be when interacted with certain 
child behaviors.  Children learn how to be parents from their own parents and 
if a child is abused, it makes sense that it would be more likely to use abuse also. 
This relationship is parallel with a priori expectations.  It is also important to 
note, mental illness, regardless of cause, is a factor that increases the probability 
of abuse.  
 While the genetic and family history variables play a role in almost every 
case of abuse, the impact of behavior also plays a role.  The reviewed literature 
expected parental stress and income would be a factor in determining abuse. 
I conclude that stress and lower levels of income determine the presence of 
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abuse, when certain behaviors are present.  These two increase the odds of 
abuse significantly.  Both the temper tantrum and failing school behaviors not 
only determined what factors increase the probability of abuse, when one of 
these behaviors are present, but also what type of abuse was more likely to be 
used.  This demonstrates a certain child behavior, which can occur randomly 
such as a temper tantrum, increases the odds the parent uses abuse.  Parental 
expectations play a critical role as well; this can be seen from the number of 
significant coefficient estimates for the failing school behavior.  The coefficient 
estimates for the failing school interaction terms demonstrate that failing 
to meet parental expectations not only increases the probability the child is 
abused, but also the probability the child is exposed to a higher level of violence. 
I initially underestimated the role of parental expectations.
 One factor I thought would increase the probability of a parent using abuse 
was alcohol consumption; however, it was never significant in any model.  This 
demonstrates that alcohol may not be a determinant in child abuse, but possibly 
in numerous other problems.  I expected income as well as family status to also 
play a larger role, which they did not.  This could be due to the fact that lower 
income families are more likely to abuse with the presence of temper tantrums. 
I thought a similar relationship would occur with the family status variables.  
 This study has produced some interesting, albeit possibly inaccurate 
results.  However, I find that there are certain genetic markers which trigger 
abuse, and there are numerous social variables which affect the decision to 
abuse and the choice of abuse type when a certain child behavior is present.   
conclusions
 The goal of this paper was to examine the parental decision structure for 
child abuse.  My initial hypothesis was that a child would behave, the parent 
would be forced to respond, and the decision to abuse would be based on social 
and genetic factors within the parent’s life, as well as the manner in which the 
parent’s perceived the child’s behavior.  I used McFadden’s (1974) conditional 
logit model as a basis for my theory to show that the decision to abuse is 
based on factors both in the parent’s life and in the child’s life.  I followed this 
with interacted logit and interacted order logit models, which used data from 
the Physical Violence in American Families Survey from 1984, to show that 
numerous biological and family history variables determine abuse regardless 
of behavior.  The social variables such as stress, were found to increase the 
probability of abuse when the child behavior is considered.  
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 Thus, I conclude that given the difficulty associated with predicting a 
problem as great as child abuse there is no specific set of variables which define 
an abuser over a non-abuser.  There are only markers, which signal who may 
be more at risk to abuse.  The decision to abuse is likely a snap judgment made 
by the parent.  Parents probably do not premeditate abuse.  As noted in the 
literature it is a combination of factors that triggers abuse.  There are biological 
markers such as gender and age which put certain parents and certain children 
at higher risk than others.  A parent who abuses is pushed to their limits by a 
certain child behavior or some other factor.  I have found certain factors which 
are present in the abusing parent’s life.  A suggestion for further study would 
be to examine the effects of child abuse on children, for example if it increases 
the risk of teenage pregnancy, psychiatric disorders, or involvement in crime 
(Afifi, Brownridge, and Cox 2006, 1093-1103; Currie and Tekin 2006; Smith 
1996, 131-142; Smith and Thornberry 1995, 451-481). 
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Appendix A
Variable Definitions of Independent Variables:
Gender of Respondent, Male=0 Female=1
Age of Respondent, Age must be equal to or above 18
Child Age- child must be under the age 18
Gender of Child, Male=0 Female=1
Respondent Father hit Mother, 0=No, 1=Yes
Respondent Mother hit Father, 0=No, 1=Yes
Respondent Arrested in previous year, 0=No, 1=Yes
Respondent Alcohol Use- measured in drinks per day
Black- respondent is African American, 1=yes, 0=no
Hispanic- respondent is Hispanic, 1=yes, 0=no
Other-respondent is other race, 1=yes, 0=no
Income variables, 1=respondent falls in specified category of income, 
0=respondent does not fall in respective category
Stressed, 0=never felt stressed, 1=includes if respondent ever feels stressed
Depressed, 0=never felt depressed, 1=includes if respondent ever feels 
depressed
Thought about suicide, 0=never thought about suicide, 1=includes if 
respondent ever thinks about suicide
Respondent hit by mother as teen, 1=yes, 0=no
Respondent hit by father as teen, 1=yes, 0=no
Woman Pregnant, 1=yes, 0=no
Family Status, 1=respondent falls in specified category of family status, 
0=respondent does not fall in respective category
Child Behavior Variables, 1=child has exhibited behavior, 0=child has not 
exhibited behavior
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Summary Statistics of Independent Variables:
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Summary Statistics for Significant Interaction Terms (TT= Temper Tantrum, 
FS=Failing School, DP=disciplinary problems at home):
Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables:
Abuse, 1=abuse was present, 0=otherwise
Abuse Type, 1=minor violence, 2=severe violence, 3= very severe 
violence, 
         0=otherwise
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Cross-Tabulations of Independent Variables
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Cross-tabulation of Child Age
Cross-Tabulation of Respondent Drinks per Day
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Cross Tabulations of Selected Interaction Terms
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A Current Microeconometric Assessment 
of the racial Wage Gap in the United states
By David Krisch
I. Introduction 
 Minority groups in the United States promoted affirmative action legislation 
in the 1960s during the civil rights movement to help ease the inequalities 
suffered in their economic history. Many labor economists have sought since 
this time to study the effects of race, gender, and the effect of income – how it 
has changed and if the gap has closed. Existing literature uses many different 
econometric models to show how the effects of race, gender, age, occupation, 
educational attainment, and geographic location on an individual comparative 
basis.  This paper will examine the effects of all of these variables jointly using 
an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis.  
 Does race effect income according to the 2005 American Community 
Survey (ACS)?  The ACS is 1 in 100 national survey that encompasses over 
1.1 million households and 2.878 million individuals (Steven et. al.).   Using 
multivariable OLS regression of such data will yield results that will provide 
an overall snapshot of the state of the modern labor economy and identify 
what problems our society has to economically overcome if an income gap 
between white males and minority groups still exists. Many other researchers 
have answered a similar question, however, the link between these variables on 
broad current level has not been drawn. 
 Many economists since the enaction of affirmative action have examined 
the effects of many different factors that influence income.  Two major labor 
economists, Jacob Mincer and Peter Blau pioneered modern understanding 
of income labor economics that inspired further labor analysis. The major 
contribution of Mincer was to connect the modern theory of human capital to 
empirical survey data on income, and apply it to labor force inequality (Rosen 
159). Mincer using a semi-log transformation analyzed the gender gap problem 
in the 1960s and 1970s by examining disparity among educational attainment 
(Rosen 159) (Bloom et.al. vi). This will be important in reviewing the results 
of the regression analysis, the use of showing how human capital will affect 
current data (apposed to the previous analysis that was rendered by Mincer), 
and the connection of the wage gap that will encompass both race and gender. 
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 Blau’s theory of status attainment describes that one can achieve a high 
social status (which is a measure of income economic status) by having an 
occupation which is associated with a higher economic benefit (Guan et. al. 
115).  Directly linked to cultural and individual microeconomic characteristics 
is higher social attainment (Guan et. al. 115).  This theory will be used in 
conjunction with Mincer’s work of human capital income analysis to both 
review current labor economics wage gap analysis and lay the framework for 
the economic model used in this paper (Guan et. al. 115).
 Other literature examines the regional wage gap with particular focus on 
race. Bisping and Fain (2005) examine the theory of a labor queue, which orders 
demographics in terms of employer favorability on a regional and national level 
(Bisping et. al. 352). The results of this study show that there is no change in 
the order the labor queue and there is no significant change in the ordering 
of the queue on a national level (Bisping et. al. 358). In some specific regions, 
however, the existence of a racial gap appears eliminated  (Bisping et. al. 358). 
 More recent wage gap analysis by Baumann (2005), examines using the 
Integrated Public Use Microdata Census project (IPUMS), if there has been a 
shift in the wage gap using time series data, specifically in Appalachian region of 
the United States (Baumann 416).  This is in response to the historical evidence 
that suggests that individuals who live in this region have lower wages when 
compared to the rest of the country (416).  The findings of this study show 
that the wage gap between the Appalachian region and that of the rest of the 
country has only decreased slightly from its level in 1970 to its level in 2000 
(439). The focus of the econometric model in this paper will depart from the 
comparative nature of a shift in the wage gap over time, but focus on whether 
this gap currently exists between all races in geographic regions.
  Further race-gender wage gap studies conducted recently narrow the 
specific hypothesis. Saunders (1995) examines the wage gap that exists on 
a regional, racial, gender, and occupational levels (Saunders 68).  Findings 
indicate that black men average income decreased, while white men’s average 
income increased over a ten-year period from 1979 to 1989 (68).  Saunders’ 
findings also indicate that black women gained ground when compared to 
white men (68).   This is a refinement of the models previously discussed, but 
when examining the income gap between women, the same results are found 
then when comparing different races (69).  
 Antecol and Bedard (2002) conclude that minority women make 
substantially less than that of their white counterparts (Antecol 122).  Neal 
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(2005) also supported this finding but insists that the wage gap is much higher 
then that was previously found in earlier analysis, such as the one conducted by 
Antecol and Bedard (Neal S1).   The use of panel data in Neal’s analysis and its 
inclusion of non-labor force individuals is the source of the underestimation of 
the wage gap (S3).  This analysis will depart from Neal’s method by examining 
only participants in the labor force market. These studies show how the Blau’s 
theory of status attainment can relate to differing groups of minorities, while 
the differing human capital between gender and races support Mincer’s theory 
of the connection between modern human capital and income.  
 Many economists have conducted studies looking at a number of different 
factors that influence income, but the analysis in this paper will seek to combine 
a number of different factors to give a general overview of the racial gap on 
differing regional levels.  Marital status, age, region, occupation, gender, race, 
number of hours worked, and educational attainment all will be combined in 
OLS regression analysis to find whether such a gap still exists from 2005 ACS 
data.  This is a departure from previous literature because of the larger scope 
of the analysis and current data for a more updated snapshot of the state of our 
economic equality. 
 Section II, Modeling and Data, contains the economic multivariable model 
that will be used in regression, how the hypothesis of the effects of race will be 
tested, description of the statistical properties of the ACS data variables used 
for this analysis, and how such data could influence the results. Section III, 
Empirical Results, will seek to explain the findings of the regression analysis. 
This section provides graphical analysis of the variables on a comparative level 
as well.  Section IV will conclude with an overview of the findings and the 
impact of such findings. 
II. Modeling and Data
 The hypothesis that is being tested by this model is that: income has a 
negative (or equal) relationship to minority groups among differing geographical 
regions, educational attainment, marital status, occupation, gender, and age. 
The primary focus will be on regional affects, however, there will be a need 
to look at the influence of the other variables in order to truly understand the 
problem of income inequality in totality.
  Evidence would support from the previous research that there is 
correlation between all of these variables and differences among these variables 
for different races compared to the historical Caucasian hierarchy that has 
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dominated economically (Bisping et. al. 352).  The status attainment theory 
that was offered by Blau in the previous section seem to confirm this finding 
and so does the research Bisping and Fain (2005) with the notion of a national 
labor queue (Bisping et. al. 352).  The model will attempt to answer the question 
from a modern perspective using the most current economic data while trying 
to paint a complete picture of the factors that influence income. 
 In order to complete such a task, the dependent variable will be in 
logarithmic form to show the percent change in income for each of the 
independent variables. This is the same form of the semi-log transformation 
that Mincer provided in his earnings equation for the dependent variable 
(Rosen 159).  In order to measure such effects of race, the coefficients of each of 
the independent variables tested in a multivariable analysis.  If the coefficient 
is negative for an independent variable then the net effect on the percentage of 
income is negative while the opposite is true for a positive coefficient value.  
 Statistical significance of each of the variables and the model as a whole 
is incredibly important in both understanding and placing confidence in the 
findings.  For individual variables, if the t statistic is greater than the critical 
value at n degrees of freedom at five percent significance then we can reject the 
null hypothesis that the coefficient is statistically insignificant. If the model, 
as a whole, is significant then the p value for the F statistic will be less than 
α=0.05 and the null hypothesis that the coefficients are jointly insignificant can 
be dismissed. 
 The hypothesis being tested in this model would be confirmed if minority 
groups made less than or equal to that of Caucasians on a regional level, as well 
differing measures of human capital, and other differing measures of individual 
characteristics.  In order to test such a hypothesis a multivariable analysis will 
be offered.  This multivariable regression will be run with numerous dummy 
variables for measures of qualitative data (such as race, region, gender, 
marital status, occupation, ect.) versus quantitative data (such as educational 
attainment and age).  There will be numerous interaction terms with race 
against occupation, education, gender, age, marital status, geographical region, 
and educational attainment.  In order to correct for perfect multicollinearity, 
one dummy variable for each group of the dummy variables that will be 
created must be excluded.  The excluded dummy variables will be reflected 
in the constant coefficient (β0) as well as the intercept value of the equation 
estimation. The model is as follows:
84
lnIncome = 
€	
f (race, gender, usual hours worked, region, education, education2, 
age, 
age2, occupation, marital status, race*gender, race*usual 
hours worked, race*region, race*education, race*education2, 
race*age, race*age2, race*occupation, race*marital status)
The above model compares the percentage change in income of a single, 
white, male, residing in the East North Central Region, and is in a management 
occupation against the other dummy variables that are in the equation.1  The 
constant is the comparative term to the rest of the dummy variables.  
 The other quantitative measures: age, years of education, and usual hours 
worked is a measure the marginal effect on the percentage change of income. 
Two variables are specifically notable.  The variables of age and years of 
education both have a squared term counterpart.  This occurs because usually 
these two variables do not move in a linear relationship as they increase, but as 
an exponential relationship (specifically as a quadratic).  The marginal effect of 
age is the sum of β2+2β3(Age). This value was computed by taking the derivative 
of the age variables.  The same transformation would be applied to education to 
find its marginal effect with respect to income. 
 The interaction terms that the economic model contains compare two 
changes from the constant, omitted dummy variables term.    Notice that these 
interaction terms encompass the race (black, white, other) and other variables 
in the equation.  This economic model is comprehensive in an attempt to 
precisely identify the factors to income in a hope to identify racial problems. 
The model is similar to that proposed by Mincer to measure wage and 
encompasses measures of status attainment by occupation proposed by Blau 
(Rosen 159) (Guan et. al. 115).  This should produce a modern economic model 
to estimate the overall affects of race on income in a hybridized OLS estimation 
model.  If the hypothesis is confirmed then the race and racial interaction terms 
should produce lower (or equal) coefficients.  This would prove that there is the 
existence of a racial wage gap today and the examination of the regional affects 
could suggest where major problems still exist as compared to others. 2
 The data used for this examination of income with respect for race has 
its limitations. The model that was proposed in the previous section only 
examines one part of the evidence that can be used in determining the effects of 
1  Full Equation in Appendix A
2 Note that time series analysis will not be offered but simply a cross sectional snapshot which cannot 
 empirically show a shift in the wage gap without the use of a Chow Test on Panel Data. 
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income distribution.  The data for this study was gathered from the Integrated 
Public Use Microdata Census project (IPUMS), which organizes and codes 
individual United States survey data (Steven et. al.).  The particular data that 
will be examined in this study will use American Community Survey (ACS) 
of 2005.  The ACS is a 1 in 100 national survey that encompasses over 1.1 
million households and 2.878 million individuals that will prove to be essential 
to the validity of the findings because of the number of observations (Steven 
et. al.).  Also if note is that this data is cross sectional data, which provides for 
a snapshot of the wage gap currently. This interpretation from the data and 
evidence should not be construed to show the shift of such a curve but how it 
affected individuals in 2005. 
 The assumption that all surveys are answered truthfully and completely 
is a flawed one.  Many individuals who answer such surveys do not always 
answer the question that is being answered or the data is not always answered 
truthfully because of a privacy concern.  This could produce bias or inconsistent 
results.  An optimal data set would contain complete and actual data on each of 
the individuals surveyed in order to lead to complete, unbiased, and consistent 
results for the OLS regression.  However, the sheer number of observations 
and the reliability of the reputable American Community Survey and IPUMS 
should decrease the probability of flawed results.  
 As was stated in previously, this data will incorporate dummy variables, 
whose observations will take either a 1 or 0.  The value of 1 will be assigned if 
the individual being surveyed fits into the particular categorical variable or 0 if 
they do not.  This measure will be applied to cross sectional, discrete, qualitative 
data while the continuous variables will take a specific input from the values 
observed.  For instance age for an individual could be 45 in contrast to the 
variable female which would take a value of 1 in the individual was female or 0 
if the individual was male. 
 The number of observations for this particular data set that is being 
regressed is 1,346,250  and the changes for the regression OLS estimates will 
be in percentage changes with respect to the percentage change in income (and 
against the constant term).  Statistically insignificant terms, probability values 
for the t statistic less than α=0.05, will not be reflected in the results but this 
will be noted as each section of the results is discussed and in Appendix B.  
  The dependent variable is the natural log of the total amount of income 
and wage.  Any observations for an individual who makes an income of zero 
will be dropped from the data because this analysis will focus on factors of the 
change in percent of income in the current labor force.  This will be important 
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when also examining the factor of age.  The variable age was dropped if the 
individual was under the age of 18 or over the age of 65.  The mean income of 
the data set was 39,624.42 and the mean age of 40.795.  
 The independent variables used in the OLS regression for race where 
divided into four dummy variables.  The first variable white, takes a value of 1 if 
the variable is white or 0 for non-white. The variable “White” is defined by those 
who are both Caucasian and Hispanic (Steven et. al.). The variable “white” will 
be omitted from the regression, will be included in the constant, and therefore 
comparative to all the other dummy variables. The variable “Black” includes 
all individuals who are of African American descent and identify themselves 
as black (Steven et. al.). The variable “Asian”, reflect those individuals who are 
Asian or Pacific Islander (Steven et. al.). The variable “other” is for those who 
are not included in the category of white, black, or Asian.  It is important to 
note that for this analysis, added to this category are the indigenous population 
(Native Americans) from the original survey results reported by the ACS and 
organized by IPUMS. 
Figure 1.  Frequency of race survey Data
White 
85%
Other
1%Asian 
5%
Black 
9%
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The graph above shows the break down of the percentages of individuals 
surveyed and included in this regression.  The number of observations as 
stated above for this data set was 1,346,250 and for this data set the amount 
of African American individuals that were sampled shows that there could be 
some bias in regression results.  According to Census Scope, which is a product 
of the Social Science Data Analysis Network, the African American population 
accounts for 12.1% of the total population for the 2000 United States Census 
Survey (“CensusScope -- Demographic Maps: African-American Population”). 
Such a discrepancy in the representation of the population through this sample 
could lead to some biased and inconsistent results, which would not reflect the 
true β for the estimation.   
 The regional variables were divided into 9 different geographical regions 
in dummy variables as designated by the United States census and IPUMS 
classification (Steven et. al.).   The East North Central region will be omitted 
from the regression because of perfect multicollinearity among dummy 
variables.  The regions in the data are as shown in Figure 2 below, along with 
mean income and number of observations for each of the specific regions.
Figure 2. regional Mean Income and Wage Observations 
Notice that the omitted variable East North Central, has a mean income of 
37,594.00 that lies somewhat in the middle of the data set which will be a good 
measure for comparing differing regions in the OLS regression analysis.    
 Occupation, marital status, and gender are generated dummy variables 
from the original equation.  There are 25 occupations that are incorporated 
into the data with varying categories and 24 will be used in the regression.  The 
variable “management” has a relatively high mean of 74,927.50 and a standard 
deviation of 61,516.55. This variable will be omitted from the regression and 
the definitions of the other occupation variables are offered in Appendix C. 
Marital status has five different dummy variables (single, married, divorced, 
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widowed, and separated) and the variable “single” is dropped from the 
regression equation.  The variable “single” has the lowest average income of 
all of the variables, 24,994.82, while those who are married have the highest 
average income, 46,950.95.  By no means is this a surprising factor, because 
those who are older tend to be married and also have a higher income.  The final 
dummy variable gender, are obviously divided into male and female variables. 
The variable male has a mean income of 48,394.13 and a standard deviation 
of 47,672.79 while females have a mean income of 30,429.30 and a standard 
deviation of 30,575.10.  A clear gender gap that still exists and the variable 
“male” will be omitted from the regression. 
Figure 3. summary statistics for Continuous Data3 
 The variable “Years of Education” was recoded in order to accommodate 
for preschool and kindergarten education.  The number of years of education 
and the percentage change in income has a positive correlation of 0.315 and 
the mean education that an individual receives in the survey is 13.49 years as 
shown above in Figure 3.  Education is a large component to income which 
is reflected in the positive correlation in the percentage change in income 
and the average individual in the data receive their high school diploma. The 
relationship between human capital (years of education being one factor in this 
case) and amount of income one receives is an already time tested model by 
Mincer (Rosen 159).  
 The final variable examined, the amount of hours usually worked in a 
workweek, also has opposite correlation effects on the percentage change in 
income.  The amount of income hours worked increases as income does. The 
average amount of hours worked for the data set is 39.8141, shown in Figure 3, 
the standard workweek.  This is not surprising and matches the intuition about 
the amount of hours worked in the American workweek. 
III. Empirical results  
 The full results of the regression analysis for the model that was in Section 
II is displayed in Appendix B.  The Breusch-Pagan test statistic of 44,583.32 
for the equation estimation identified the problem of heteroskedasticity.  This 
3  Values will be rounded to four decimal places. 
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BP test statistic has a p value of 0.000 and because it is less than α=0.05, the 
null hypothesis of homoskedasticity can be rejected.  This has prompted the 
regression to be re-estimated with robust standard errors using the white 
correlation matrix to correct this problem. With the correction, the first of 
three different results of particular interest will be discussed in detail, after 
significance of the individual variables and the model as a whole is discussed. 
 The F test statistic, which tests that all of the coefficients are significantly 
different than zero, yielded a result of 5,696.86.  The p value for the F statistic 
for this equation is equal to 0.000 which is less than α=0.05 so we can reject that 
the coefficients of the model are jointly insignificant.  This result is reflected 
in Appendix B.  Each individual variable was also tested for significance by 
calculating a t test statistic from the regression results.  The p values for the t 
test statistic that were greater than α=0.05 are reflected in Appendix B without 
asterisks. 
 For instance, the p value of the t statistic for the variable “other” indicates 
that there is not a difference in the nominal income of an individual who’s race 
is considered “other” against the constant white individual with all of the same 
characteristics besides race.  The same is true of occupational, marital status, 
regional, and continuous (usual hours worked and years of education) variables 
that are interacted with race.  The interaction variables that were interacted 
with age were dropped for reasons of perfect multicollinearity and are not 
reflected above for the races of Asian and other.  This lack of significance for 
the variable of “other” is in conflict with the original hypothesis that being non-
white has a negative impact on an individual’s nominal income.  This will be 
compared to the results found for significant variables in the preceding part of 
this section and in the conclusion.    It should also be mentioned that in order 
to combat omitted variable bias the variables that are in Appendix B without 
asterisks are included in the final regression.  Omitting such variables could 
cause biased estimates of the parameters.  
 The evaluation of the R-squared term is essential to understanding the 
prediction capability of the model as a whole. The R-squared term reflects the 
proportion of the variance of the dependent variable that can be explained 
by the independent variables (“Annotated Stata Output: Regression”).  The 
R-squared value for the equation that was regressed from the model in 
Section II is 0.4902.  This would indicate that 49.02% of the variance in the 
percent change in income could be predicted from the independent variables 
(“Annotated Stata Output: Regression”).  This is not a bad measure of fit for how 
well the model is at predicting income assuming that there are many different 
90
variables that can be used to predict income which cannot be measured, such as 
drive to succeed and ambition.  This R-squared value vastly improved when the 
variable of occupation was added to the regression and therefore occupation 
improved the prediction of the dependent variable, which is to be expected. 
 The continuous variable “years of education” produced a value of -0.0235 
and a value of 0.0042 for the variable “years of education2”.  This relationship 
between income and education in quadratic terms is the same function that 
Mincer used in his earnings equation to examine the gender wage gap in the 
United States (Rosen 159).  Such will be applied here to look at the differences 
in racial variables with individuals who have the same amount of education.  In 
Figure 4, the table reflects the significant interaction terms between race and 
years of education.  Also, there are the coefficients for the variables of race in 
the East North Central Division.  This analysis will first encompass how race 
effects income against education in the East North Central Division and then 
examine how these effects are administered for other regions of the United 
States in the same comparative nature against the constant term with the same 
amount of education.
Figure 4.  statistically significant regression results for Education, 
race, and Gender in the East North Central region (and applicable 
interactions)4
Variable2  Coefficient     Robust Std. Error
Year of Education       -0.0235     0.0015
Year of Education2     0.0042    0.0001
Black*Years of Education     -0.0194     0.0058
Black*Years of Education2     0.0010     0.0002
Black     -0.2200     0.0531
Asian      0.3113     0.0417
Female     -0.2630     0.0019
Black*Female     0.1326     0.0065
Asian*Female     0.0888     0.0079
Other*Female     0.0528     0.0208
Constant     5.9599     0.0148 
4	 Not	included	in	the	findings	are	the	insignificant	variables	which	had	a	p	value	for	the	t	statistic	greater	than		 	
 α=0.05 which are in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4 contains some interesting results go to disproving the hypothesis of 
being a non-white male has a negative affect on income in this particular region. 
Asian males and females have a larger change in income than the constant 
white single male term, which is reflected in the constant variable.  To see the 
results more clearly, Figure 5 has a linear representation of the marginal change 
in income on one additional year of education. 
Figure 5. Marginal Effect of Education on Managerial Income by race 
and Gender in the East North Central Division 
What should be noted in this graphical depiction is the intercept of each of 
the linear equations graphed with respect to the constant.  Single managers 
who reside in this region are all compared with education for differing variants 
for race and gender.  The line with the lowest intercept is the black female. 
The average black single female manager in this region makes 33.10% less than 
the constant comparative term whereas the white female makes only 26.30% 
less than the constant term. The black female makes substantially less than her 
white counterpart.
 The trend for Asian individuals receiving more income for an increase in 
education transcends gender.  The Asian male makes 31.11% more than the 
constant term and the Asian female only makes 13.11% less than the constant 
term.  Both of these terms show that Asians make more on average than their 
white counterparts when compared to gender. This is a clear depiction that the 
gender gap exists, however, Asian individuals receive the highest utility out of 
all of the racial groups. 
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 The racial wage gap still clearly exists between black and white individuals 
with the same constant comparative dummy variable terms. Black individuals 
make 22% less than the constant comparative term in this equation.  This 
indicates that Asian women, “other” women, white males, and Asian males 
make more than a black male in a managerial position for the same amount 
of education in the East North Central Region.  These groups receive more 
income than the black male for each additional year of education.  Such a result 
is discouraging when examining the racial wage gap divide in the United States 
and reinforces the hypothesis that such a wage gap does still exist.  
 The same comparisons can be made against other continuous non-
dummy variables in the OLS regression results.  The coefficients for the usual 
hours worked, age, and age2 is shown below in Figure 6.  
Figure 6.  Continuous Coefficient Estimations for Usual Hours Worked, 
Age, and Age2
Omitted from Figure 6 are the interaction variables between race and age 
dropped for reasons of multicollinearity.  Also omitted from Figure 6 is the 
interaction variables Black*Usual Hours Worked and Other*Usual Hours 
Worked, because of lack of significance.  These continuous variables can be 
used with respect to the constant and the use of the other dummy variables to 
calculate intercepts and find the effect of usual hours worked and age on income. 
The amount of hours worked does positively increase the amount an individual 
earns by 3.89% for each additional hour worked and this number decreases by 
0.58%5 for each additional hour that an Asian individual works.  The increase 
in the amount an individual earns being positively correlated to income is 
not surprising and are both supported by the previous research done in labor 
economics by Mincer, Blau, and others previously cited in the literature review 
((Rosen 159) (Guan et. al. 115) (Bisping et. al. 352)).   The interesting result 
is the effect of being Asian and the number of hours worked on the constant 
term.  This gain in earnings for other races is higher for the number of hours 
5  Total Marginal Effect for an Asian individual is 3.31% for Hours worked within a workweek.
Variable
Age
Age2
Usual Hours Worked
Asian*Usual hours worked
Coefficient
0.1132
-0.0012
0.0389
-0.0058
Robust Std. Error
0.0005
0.0000
0.0001
0.0005
T Statistic
220.0100
-196.6000
340.5800
-12.3700
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worked when compared to the Asian individual. Such a finding is paramount 
in balancing the effects of income and race with continuous variables (like the 
results found for years of education). 
 The variables for age and age2 create a parabolic effect, which is shown 
in Figure 8. (Guan et. al. 115). The marginal effect of one year of age is β1 + 
0.1131896 +2*-0.0011914(Age) by taking the derivative of the age function, but 
its quadratic form is graphed in Figure 7.    
Figure 7. Effect of age on the percentage of income in East North 
Central region for the constant white single male manager in the East 
North Central region compared with a black individual with the same 
characteristics.  
 We see this in Figure 7, with the maximum point of the quadratic age 
function residing at 47.50.  An individual’s income after this point will not 
increase as age increases.  Also, shown in Figure 7 is the age quadratic function 
for a black individual with the same characteristics in the East North Central 
Region.  Here the wage gap between the two groups can clearly be seen, as was 
the case in the analysis for educational attainment. Focusing on the results of 
the amount of education and the percentage change in income is the original 
function that Mincer used in his original analysis (Rosen 159). Both education 
and age are measures of human capital, however, the results of the years of 
education analysis provide a more in-depth analysis and allow for interaction 
terms without multicollinearity.  
 The regional effects on income are interesting especially when looking at 
the variables of race.  Such are interesting and help to pinpoint specific areas 
in which progress has been made in closing the wage gap and comparing 
how minorities fair in these regions.  Figure 8 shows the regression results 
from statistically significant variables of the percentage change in income 
when compared to the constant East North Central region with all of the 
94
same constant dummy variables except for race.  It is important to note that 
the significant interaction terms are in terms of the percentage difference in 
income when compared to that specific race variable for the East North Central 
Division.  For instance the interaction variable for “Black*Middle Atlantic” is 
the percentage change between an individual who is Black, resides in the East 
North Central Region, Single, and working in a managerial position.  Such 
results are illustrated more clearly in Figure 10, which depicts the percentage 
change using a histogram. 
Figure 8.  statistically significant regional Effects on Income (with race 
interaction) compared to the constant regional variable East North 
Central. 
region     Coefficient     robust std. Error
New England     0.1109     0.0037
Middle Atlantic     0.0793     0.0028
West North Central     -0.0758     0.0033
East South Central     -0.0941     0.0038
West South Central     -0.1034     0.0031
South Atlantic     -0.0076     0.0026
Mountain     -0.0371     0.0035
Pacific     0.0878     0.0028
Black*Middle Atlantic     0.0770     0.0110
Black*New England     0.0720     0.0185
Black*West North Central     0.0465     0.0182
Black*South Atlantic     0.0245     0.0093
Black*Pacific      0.0565     0.0130
Asian*West North Central     0.0644     0.0270
Asian*West South Central     0.0598     0.0186
Asian*South Atlantic      0.0473     0.0164
Asian*Mountain     0.0910     0.0210
Asian*Pacific     0.0670     0.0142
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Figure 9. Managerial Income Percentage Change with respect to the 
Constant term of East North Central White single Male 
The graph in Figure 9 and the table in Figure 8 provide interesting results for 
analysis.  We can see for the New England Region that the wage for a white 
individual increases by 11.09%, however, a black individual with the same 
microeconomic characteristics in the same region only has 7.20% increase in 
wage in income from the black individual in the East North Central Region. 
The persistence and widening of the wage gap in the New England Region is 
clear when looking at the comparative variables. If the black individual had 
received the same increase in salary as the white individual then the wage gap 
would be the same as East North Central division with the same characteristics. 
This is not the case however, with a discouraging increase in the differences in 
wage with an increase of 3.89% in the racial wage gap. This is in contrast to the 
West North Central Division. 
 The interaction terms between Asian, Black, and West North Central 
Division are statistically significantly.  The regional variable West North 
Central has decreased by 7.58% for the amount of income received for a white 
individual with the same microeconomic characteristics.  An Asian individual’s 
income with the same characteristics has an increased income of 6.44% and 
a black individual has an increased income by 4.65% when compared to the 
racial variables for the East North Central region depicted in Figure 4.  The 
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more significant of the two findings is not the increasing of the income gap 
between Asians and Whites in the West North Central Division but the 
decreasing of the income gap between Black and White individuals with the 
same characteristics when compared to the East North Central Region.  Such 
a gap leaves black individuals with only a 9.77% difference in wage with their 
white counterparts in this region.  This is a 12.23% narrowing from the 22.00% 
gap in the East North Central Division between a black and white individual 
with the same characteristics. 
 Two elements should be reiterated.  The first element that should be noted 
is the absence of the variable “other” in this particular variable analysis.   This 
would suggest that this variable and its interaction terms are not significantly 
different from the constant term.  This applies equally to the other variables for 
interaction that were not included in Figure 8.  The second element that should 
be noted is the relationship that can be formed between the dummy variables, 
which were not discussed (marital status and occupation), the interaction of 
these variables with the race dummy variables, and the interaction of these 
variables with the continuous variables discussed in the first part of this 
section.
 The statistically significant marital status variables, in Appendix B, can be 
applied in the same way for analysis of both interaction and non-interaction 
terms of the variables with respect to the constant. For instance an individual, 
who is white, married, resides in the East North Central Division, and a manager 
makes 15.11% more than a single individual who has the same characteristics. 
These terms could also appear in the graph of Figure 5 to show how a constant 
amount of education can affect the overall percentage of an individual income 
and how this affects their marginal effect on income.  This same approach can 
be applied to occupation as well.  
 The implementation of comparing multiple different incomes for 
occupational variables can be applied for analysis to gain both an industry and 
skill based analysis. An individual who is white and works in the computer 
industry makes 11.83% more than the manager in the East North Central 
region with the same microeconomic characteristics.  A black individual in the 
computer industry makes only 10.13% more than a black manager in the East 
North Central region with the same microeconomic characteristics.  This is 
further evidence that a racial gap does exist between individuals in other high 
skilled labor markets.  This same analysis can be applied to non-skilled based 
jobs by applying the findings in Appendix B. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 By combining the theories previously explored in this field labor economics, 
a suitable model was formed in order to diagnose and analyze the current state 
of the racial wage gap (Rosen 159) (Guan et. al. 115).  Through the use of ACS 
data and multivariable OLS regression, an in-depth analysis of variables that 
pertain to the percentage of income was completed in Section III.  Evidence in 
this section shows that there is an existence of a racial and gender based wage 
gap in the United States both on a regional and national level, however, this is 
an oversimplification of the problem. 
 The literature review shows that a racial wage gap still exists on a national 
level but not on regional level from Bisping and Fain’s findings (Bisping et. al. 
352).  The previous review of analysis show that there is an existence of an 
income gap between African American individuals and white single manager 
individuals in the East North Central Region of the United States.  Being an 
African American has a negative effect on income.  The gender gap was also 
shown in this analysis as well.  Also being a white, black, other, or Asian female 
has a negative effect on income against their microeconomic identical male 
counterpart.  
 The surprising finding of this study shows that there is a wage gap between 
Asian individuals and white individuals with the same microeconomic 
characteristics.  This might be the discrepancy that was found on the regional 
level in East North Central region in this study and that found by Bisping 
and Fain’s findings (Bisping et. al. 352).  Breaking the groups down into more 
specific classifications in  and making this a broad overall snapshot from the 
most recent data available were the most important distinctions from how this 
study differed from other previous analysis.  
 Even though this model is comprehensive, adding more variables and 
interaction terms could give clearer results for future studies. This would then 
broaden the scope of the study and provide more information on other variables 
that pertain to income such as place of origin or weight.  Also, classifying 
groups by ethnicity and race could provide more accurate results if the data 
sample was an accurate representation of the United States population.  The 
analysis provided in this study would be most useful in showing how we need 
as a society to correct the disparities between African Americans, females, 
and white males with the same microeconomic characteristics.  Only through 
conscience effort can this goal be achieved through a national and regional 
level.   Such was the attempt of Affirmative Action but it is clear by this analysis 
that the goal was not accomplished in 2005.   
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Appendix A. Full Equation Regressed
lnIncomei = β0+ β2Age + β3Age2 + β4Usualhoursworked + β5MiddleAtlantic + β6EastNorthCentral + 
β7WestNorthCentral + β8EastSouthCentral + β9WestSouthCentral 
+β10SouthAtlantic +β11Mountain + β12Pacific+β13Black+β14Asian +β15Other + 
β16Female +β17MarriedSpouse + β18Widowed +β19Seperated +β20Divorced + 
β21YearsofEducation + β22YearsofEducation2+ β23Buisopp+ β24FinancialSpecialist + 
β25Compmath + β26EngArch + β27Science +β28CommunitySocial + β29Legal + β30Edocc 
+β31ArtMediaSports + β32HealthCarePrac + β33Healthcaresupport+β34Protect 
+β35Food + β36CleanMaintain +β37PersonalCare +β38Sales +β39OffAdSup 
+β40FarmFish +β41Construction +β42Extraction +β43InstallMaintRepair 
+β44Production +β45Transportation +β46Military + β48(Black*MiddleAtlantic)i+ β49 
(Black* EastNorthCentral)I …+β55(Black*Pacific)i + β56(Asian*MiddleAtlantic)i+ 
β57(Asian*EastNorthCentral)I …+β63(Asian*Pacific)i+ β64(Other* MiddleAtlantic)
i+ β65(Other*EastNorthCentral)I …+β71(Other*Pacific)I + β72(Black*MarriedSpouse)
i+ β73(Black*Widowed)I …+β75(Black*Divorced)i+ β76(Asian*MarriedSpouse)
i+ β77(Asian*Widowed)I …+β79(Asian*Divorced)i+ β80(Other*MarriedSpouse)
i+ β81(Other*Widowed)I …+β83 (Other*Divorced)i+ β84(Black*Yearsofed)i+ 
β85(Black*YearsofEducation2)I +β86(Asian*Yearsofed)i+ β87(Asian *YearsofEducation2)I 
+β88(Other*Yearsofed)i+ β89(Other*YearsofEducation2)I +β90(Black*Female)i+ β91(Asian* 
Female)I +β92(Other*Female)i+ β93(Black*Age)i+ β94(Black*Age2)I+β95(Asian*Age)
i+ β96(Asian*Age2)I +β97(Other*Age)I + β99(Other*Age2)I + β100(Black*Buisopp)
i+ β102(Black*FinancialSpecialist)I +…+β124 (Black*Military) + β125(Asian*Buisopp)
i+ β126(Asian*FinancialSpecialist)I+…+β149(Asian*Military) + β150(Other*Buisopp)i+ 
β151(Other*FinancialSpecialist)I+…+β171(Other*Military)
Appendix B. Full Regression Results (*Statistically Significant at the 5% Level)
      Est. Earnings     robust     
Variable     Effect     std. Err.     P>t
Constant     5.9599*     0.0148     0
            
AGe:               
Age     0.1132*     0.0005     0
Age^2     -0.0012*     0.0000     0
Black*Age     0.0034     0.0018     0.056
Black*Age^2     0.0000     0.0000     0.814
            
usuAL Hours worKeD:               
Usual Hours Worked     0.0389*     0.0001     0
Asian*Usual Hours Worked     -0.0058*     0.0005     0
Black*Usual Hours Worked     -0.0007     0.0004     0.085
Other*Usual Hours Worked     -0.0023     0.0012     0.051
            
eDucAtionAL AttAinment:          
Years of Education     -0.0235*     0.0015     0
Years of Education^2     0.0042*     0.0001     0
Black*Years of Education    -0.0194*     0.0058     0.001
Black*Years of Education^2     0.0010*     0.0002     0
Asian*Years of Education     -0.0047     0.0046     0.301
Asian*Year of Education^2     -0.0004     0.0002     0.062
Other*Years of Education     -0.0186     0.0122     0.129
Other*Years of Education^2     0.0002     0.0005     0.781
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reGion:               
New England     0.1109*     0.0037     0
Middle Atlantic     0.0793*     0.0028     0
West North Central     -0.0758*     0.0033     0
East South Central     -0.0941*     0.0038     0
West South Central     -0.1034*     0.0031     0
South Atlantic     -0.0076*     0.0026     0.004
Mountain     -0.0371*     0.0035     0
Pacific    0.0878*      0.0028     0
Black*Middle Atlantic     0.0770*     0.0110     0
Black*New England     0.0720*     0.0185     0
Black*West North Central     0.0465*     0.0182     0.011
Black*East South Central     -0.0096     0.0119     0.419
Black*West South Central     -0.0032     0.0112     0.776
Black*South Atlantic     0.0245*     0.0093     0.009
Black*Mountain     0.0388     0.0208     0.062
Black*Pacific     0.0565*     0.0130     0
Asian*Middle Atlantic     -0.0085     0.0162     0.599
Asian*New England     0.0246     0.0221     0.267
Asian*West North Central     0.0644*     0.0270     0.017
Asian*East South Central     0.0443     0.0327     0.175
Asian*West South Central     0.0598*     0.0186     0.001
Asian*South Atlantic     0.0473*     0.0164     0.004
Asian*Mountain     0.0910*     0.0210     0
Asian*Pacific     0.0670*     0.0142     0
Other*Middle Atlantic     0.0623     0.0408     0.127
Other*New England     0.0088     0.0485     0.855
Other*West North Central     -0.0871     0.0450     0.053
Other*East South Central     0.0015     0.0550     0.978
Other*West South Central     -0.0212     0.0342     0.536
Other*South Atlantic     0.0201     0.0357     0.573
Other*Mountain     -0.0427     0.0346     0.216
Other*Pacific     -0.0625     0.0336     0.063
            
rAce:               
Black     -0.2200*     0.0531     0
Asian     0.3113*     0.0417     0
Other     0.1420     0.1018     0.163
            
GenDer:               
Female     -0.2630*     0.0019    0
Black*Female     0.1326*     0.0065    0
Asian*Female     0.0888*     0.0079    0
Other*Female     0.0528*     0.0208    0.011
            
mAritAL stAtus:               
Married     0.1511*     0.0023     0
Widowed     0.0729*     0.0072     0
Separated     -0.0368*     0.0067     0
Divorced     0.0792*     0.0032     0
Black*Married     0.0089     0.0070     0.202
Black*Widowed     -0.0250     0.0195     0.199
Black*Separated     0.0272     0.0144     0.06
Black*Divorced     0.0015     0.0093     0.873
Asian*Married     -0.0251*     0.0085     0.003
Asian*Widowed     -0.0082     0.0321     0.798
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Asian*Separated     0.1047*     0.0330     0.001
Asian * Divorced     0.0848*     0.0163     0
Other*Married     0.0573*     0.0203     0.005
Other*Widowed     0.1001     0.0614     0.103
Other*Separated     0.0231     0.0523     0.658
Other*Divorced     0.0479     0.0283     0.09
            
occuPAtion:               
BusinessOp     -0.0412*     0.0055     0
Financial     -0.0242*     0.0053     0
ComputerMath     0.1184*     0.0049     0
Engineering     0.0292*     0.0049     0
Science     -0.1913*     0.0079     0
Community     -0.4519*     0.0062     0
Legal     0.0011     0.0080     0.892
Teachers     -0.4998*     0.0039     0
Media     -0.3807*     0.0074     0
Doctors     0.0217*     0.0039     0
Nurses     -0.4313*     0.0064     0
Protect     -0.2732*     0.0057     0
Food     -0.7077*     0.0051     0
Maintain     -0.7162*     0.0058     0
PersonalCare     -0.7574*     0.0071     0
Sales     -0.3593*     0.0037     0
OfficeAdmin     -0.3120*     0.0032     0
FamingFishing     -0.9619*     0.0108     0
Construction     -0.3398*     0.0044     0
Extraction     -0.4208*     0.0218     0
InstallMaint     -0.2248*     0.0044     0
Production     -0.3480*     0.0039     0
Transportation     -0.5340*     0.0044     0
Military     -0.3405*     0.0132     0
Black*BusinessOp     0.0574*     0.0180     0.001
Black*Financial     -0.0133     0.0185     0.47
Black*ComputerMath     0.1003*     0.0182     0
Black*Engineering     0.0851*     0.0225     0
Black*Science     0.0809*     0.0309     0.009
Black*Community     0.1503*     0.0157     0
Black*Legal     0.0293     0.0290     0.311
Black*Teachers     0.1363*     0.0130     0
Black*Media     0.1660*     0.0318     0
Black*Doctors     -0.0101     0.0150     0.501
Black*Protect     0.0426*     0.0161     0.008
Black*Food     -0.0220     0.0159     0.166
Black*Maintain     -0.0027     0.0167     0.873
Black*PersonalCare     0.0348     0.0191     0.068
Black*Sales     -0.1653*     0.0131     0
Black*OfficeAdmin     0.0543*     0.0099     0
Black*FamingFishing     0.0098     0.0546     0.858
Black*Construction     -0.1412*     0.0190     0
Black*Extraction     0.0021     0.1207     0.986
Black*InstallMaint     0.0787*     0.0176     0
Black*Production     -0.0284*     0.0130     0.029
Black*Transportation     0.0461*     0.0136     0.001
Black*Military     0.2702*     0.0363     0
Asian*BusinessOp     0.0067     0.0252     0.792
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Appendix C. Definitions of Occupational Variables
Variable Occupation Definition
BusinessOp Business Operations Specialists
Financial Financial Specialists
ComputerMath Computer and Mathematical Occupations
Engineering Architecture and Engineering Occupations
Science Life, Physical, and Social Science Occupations
Community Community and Social Services Occupations
Legal Legal Occupations
Teachers Education, Training, and Library Occupations
Media Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media Occupations
Doctors Healthcare Practitioners and Technical Occupations
Nurses Healthcare Support Occupations
Protect Protective Service Occupations
Food Food Preparation and Serving Occupations
Maintaince Building and Grounds Cleaning and Maintenance Occupations
PersonalCare Personal Care and Service Occupations
Sales Sales Occupations
OfficeAdmin Office and Administrative Support Occupations
FamingFishing Farming, Fishing, and Forestry Occupations
Construction Construction Trades
Extraction Extraction Workers
InstallMaint Installation, Maintenance, and Repair Workers
Production Production Occupations
Transportation Transportation and Material Moving Occupations
Military Military Personnel
Asian*Financial     -0.0854*     0.0207     0
Asian*ComputerMath     0.0710*     0.0166     0
Asian*Engineering     0.0747*     0.0187     0
Asian*Science     -0.0689*     0.0246     0.005
Asian*Community     -0.0984*     0.0346     0.004
Asian*Legal     0.0119     0.0415     0.775
Asian*Teachers     -0.1085*     0.0210     0
